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Ironing Out the Flat Tax
David A. Weisbach*
This paper considers the design and implementation of the
“Flat Tax” as proposed by Robert Hall and Alvin Rabushka and
advocated by prominent policymakers.1 The purpose is to get a sense
of the potential complexity and resulting compliance and
administrative costs of the system.
Compliance and administrative costs are central to evaluating
the Flat Tax. Much of its appeal lies in its alleged simplicity—the
vaunted postcard returns resonate with many. If the claims of
simplicity are not correct, proponents will have to make stronger
arguments about its efficiency and fairness benefits. In fact, the
benefits of the Flat Tax over other similar taxes, such as a VAT, may
depend largely on claims of simplicity. If the claims of simplicity are
not correct, the argument for the Flat Tax may fail. Moreover, if the
claims of simplicity are not correct, there are likely to be gaps and
loopholes that create adverse incentives and unfairness, weakening
the efficiency and equity arguments. The devil might truly be in the
details. To date, however, no details of the design of the Flat Tax
have been offered.2

* Associate Professor, The University of Chicago Law School. I thank Julie Roin
and participants in Georgetown Law Center’s Ernst & Young Tax Policy Seminar
for comments.
1 Robert E. Hall and Alvin Rabushka, The Flat Tax, 2d ed. (Hoover Inst. Press,
1995). Several members of Congress have introduced bills based on the Flat Tax.
Congressman Armey’s proposal is known as “The Freedom and Fairness
Restoration Act of 1995,” H.R. 2060, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1995). Senator
Specter has an identical proposal. S. 488, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
The term “flat tax” could mean any number of different things. Most
generically, one might think it refers to any tax that has a proportional rather than
progressive rate structure. As used in this paper, Flat Tax (capitalized to indicate
the specificity of the reference) refers to the specific proposal set forth by Hall and
Rabushka.
2 Hall and Rabushka have offered a broad outline of the proposal. The Flat Tax
converts the current income tax into a national tax on consumption whose
economic effects resemble those of a valued-added tax (VAT). It consists of two
parts, a tax on individuals and a tax on businesses. Individuals are taxed on wages
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This paper will address only the design issues relating to the
Flat Tax. It will not discuss the merits of an income tax versus a
and other employee compensation. Dividends, interest, rents, and capital gains are
not taxed to individuals. No personal deductions, such as the deductions for
mortgage interest or charitable donations, would be allowed. The individual tax is
progressive at the lower end through a personal allowance or standard deduction,
and flat thereafter.
The business tax is computed much like a VAT. Businesses are taxed on the
difference between gross receipts from sales of property or services less the cost of
business inputs, wages, and retirement contributions. The tax provides current
expensing of all business purchases, and businesses may not deduct interest or
dividends and do not include financial income when received.
The major difference between the Flat Tax and a VAT is that in a VAT,
businesses do not deduct wages and individuals are not taxed on wages. VATs are
collected entirely at the business level. In the Flat Tax, businesses get a deduction
for and individuals are taxed on wages. The Flat Tax splits the collection of the tax
between individuals and businesses but combined, the tax base is the same as the
base of a VAT. The reason collection is split in the Flat Tax is so that individuals
can be taxed on wages at a progressive rate.
From this basic outline, it is clear that the Flat Tax offers some
simplification. Individuals may not claim personal deductions such as the medical
expense or mortgage interest deductions, simplifying the law for many. In
addition, individuals are not taxed on capital gains or interest. Businesses would no
longer have to compute depreciation. These benefits alone may significantly
reduce compliance costs.
But the proposal offered by Hall and Rabushka, and the legislation
introduced based on their proposal, offers few additional details. We don’t know,
for example, the rules for such everyday transactions as the formation of a business,
the liquidation of a business, or the sale of property on credit. Our economy is
large and complex. The simple outline given by Hall and Rabushka does not come
close to legislation that could actually be enacted. Without more detail, the
benefits of the Flat Tax cannot be determined.
There have been several prior articles discussing design issues in the Flat Tax
or similar taxes. The most comprehensive is Richard L. Doernberg, A Workable
Flat Rate Consumption Tax, 70 Iowa L. Rev. 425 (1985). See also, Alan Feld,
Living with the Flat Tax, __ National Tax J. 603 (199_); Ronald Pearlman, Fresh
from the River Styx: The Achilles’ Heels’ of Tax Reform Proposals, 51 National
Tax J. 569 (1998); Vernon Hoven, Flat Tax as Seen by a Tax Preparer, __ Tax
Notes 747 (August 7, 1995); Michael Calegari, Flat Taxes and Effective Tax
Planning, 51 National Tax J. 689 (1998); Joint Committee on Taxation,
Discussion of Issues Relating to “Flat” Tax Rate Proposals (1995). See Alan
Schenk, The Business Transfer Tax: The Value Added by Subtraction, __ Tax
Notes 351 (January 27, 1986) for a discussion of subtraction method VATs which,
as noted in the text, resemble the Flat Tax.
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consumption tax. Nor will it discuss important questions of
economic efficiency or the equitable distribution of the tax burden
under the Flat Tax, except as they arise from design problems. The
transition to the Flat Tax will be discussed briefly, but only with
respect to design issues, not efficiency or fairness concerns. In
addition, the paper will assume that the Flat Tax is enacted in
relatively pure form, so that political compromises that introduce
additional complexity are not generally discussed. These issues are all
important but are well covered in prior literature.3 The major hole
remaining is the design of the system.
Although this paper is written at the level of implementation
rather than theory, there is an important underlying theoretical
problem. Suppose we identify an anomaly in the treatment of a
transaction under the Flat Tax. Someone might be over or undertaxed or there may be an unintended incentive, maybe a loophole,
that causes taxpayers to structure transactions inefficiently to avoid
tax. The question is whether the tax should be amended to fix the
anomaly or whether it should be left as is. This requires a trade-off
between administrative costs of fixing the problem and the
inefficiency, unfairness, and revenue effects of the leaving anomaly.
How these trade-offs should be made is not fully resolved.4 Hall and
Rabushka, for the issues they identified, had a strong preference for
simplicity as witnessed by the proposed elimination of all personal
deductions. But they failed to identify (or intentionally ignored) a
large number of issues, and decisions must be made on these issues.
The recommendations here are based on my judgment about the
costs of complexity compared to the costs of a given anomaly. These
judgments may be completely wrong (although I don’t think so), but
the point of the paper is not to recommend final resolution of the
issues but rather to identify the issues that must be dealt with in
designing the Flat Tax and to evaluate the costs of solutions.
3 For a good introduction to the literature, see Economic Effects of Fundamental

Tax Reform (Aaron and Gale, eds., 1996).
4 See Louis Kaplow, Accuracy, Complexity and the Income Tax, 14 J. Law, Econ,

and Organization 61 (1998); Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity
of Legal Rules, 11 J. Law, Econ, and Organization 150 (1995); Colin Diver, The
Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 Yale L.J. 65 (1983) for a discussion
of this issue.

Chicago Working Paper in Law and Economics

4

The Flat Tax proposed by Hall and Rabushka is a tax on
consumption, not income. Section I of this paper, therefore, gives
background on consumption taxes and the basic mechanics of the
Flat Tax. It also considers several features unique to the Flat Tax
that play a prominent role in its design. Section II considers six
major design issues. Section III then gives a very brief discussion of
other design issues that will have to be resolved to implement the
Flat Tax. Section IV evaluates the design and provides a conclusion.
I. Background
A. Consumption Tax Basics
This section provides background on consumption taxes in
general, not limited to the Flat Tax. This background is necessary
for understanding the Flat Tax. All of the material provided in this
section can be found in prior literature.5
The goal of a consumption tax is to capture all consumption in
the economy. Instead of measuring consumption directly, say
through a tax on consumption purchases, consumption can be
derived from income. Income in a given period is equal to the sum of
a taxpayer’s consumption and his change in savings during that
5 The literature is vast. For basic background on the operation of consumption

taxes see, William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal
Income Tax, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1113 (1974); Michael Graetz, Implementing a
Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1575 (1979); Alvin C. Warren,
Jr., Would a Consumption Tax be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 890 Yale L.J.
1081 (1980); Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Is the Debate Between an
Income Tax and a Consumption Tax a Debate About Risk? Does it Matter?, 47
Tax L. Rev. 377 (1992); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., How Much Capital Income Taxed
Under an Income Tax is Exempt Under a Cash Flow Tax, 52 Tax L. Rev. 1
(1996); David Bradford, Untangling the Income Tax (1986). For background on
value-added taxes, see, among other books and articles, Charles E. McLure, Jr.,
The Valued-Added Tax, Key to Deficit Reduction? (AEI Studies in Fiscal Policy
(1987)). For economic analysis, see, Economic Effects of Fundamental Tax
Reform, (Aaron & Gale, ed.) (1996); Congressional Budget Office, The
Economic Effects of Comprehensive Tax Reform (1997).
As most of the conclusions of this section can be found in a variety of other
sources, I will not explicitly footnote each conclusion. As stated in the text, all of
the material in this section can easily be found in prior literature, including that
listed above.
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period. By simple algebra, then, consumption is equal to income less
the change in savings.
Change in savings in a given period is equal to the difference
between amounts saved and amounts withdrawn from savings to be
used for consumption. We can measure this difference by measuring
difference in receipts from the sale of investments and purchases of
investments. Net receipts in a period means that the taxpayer
withdrew savings to consume and net payments means the taxpayer
saved. As a result, we can tax consumption by measuring cash flows,
including receipts, and deducting outlays (other than consumption
outlays). A tax following this pattern is called a personal cash-flow
consumption tax.
One important consequence of this logic is that the major
difference between an income tax and a consumption tax is the
timing of basis recovery. In an income tax, there is no deduction for
savings. Instead, investments are given tax basis which is recovered
when the investment is recovered (e.g., through depreciation or on
sale). In a cash-flow consumption tax, basis is recovered immediately
through a deduction for outlays (i.e., investments are expensed).
A second consequence of this logic is that, under certain
assumptions, a consumption tax does not tax (exempts) the yield on
investments. The intuition is that the immediate deduction in the
cash-flow consumption tax creates tax savings, which can be
invested. When the investment is sold, the taxpayer must pay tax on
the full amount realized, but the tax is exactly equal to the invested
value of the original tax savings.
Example
Suppose a taxpayer earns $100 and wants to invest it.
Assume the taxpayer has two choices: an investment that is
immediately deductible but which is fully taxed on sale, and an
investment that is not deductible but whose yield is exempt.
Assume the tax rate is 40 percent and that the pre-tax return on
investments during the relevant time period is 50 percent.
If the taxpayer invests in the asset with the exempt yield, the
taxpayer must first pay tax on the $100 earnings. Thus, the
taxpayer must pay a tax of $40 and has only $60 to invest. The
$60 will earn a 50 percent return, or $30, which is not taxed.
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Withdrawing the initial $60 invested is tax free, leaving the
taxpayer with $90.
If the taxpayer invests in the deductible investment, the
taxpayer will be able to invest the full $100. The $100 will earn a
50% return giving the taxpayer $150. When the cash is
withdrawn from the investment, the taxpayer must pay a tax of
40% of $150, or $60, leaving the taxpayer with $90. Thus, the
immediately deductible investment and the yield-exempt
investment leave the taxpayer in the identical place, with $90.6
A cash-flow consumption tax allows immediate deductions for
all investments and, therefore, under the assumptions, exempts the
yield on investments. Therefore, we can replicate a cash-flow
consumption tax by simply not taxing the yield on assets but also not
allowing a deduction for purchases. This method of taxation is called
“yield exemption.” The Flat Tax uses yield exemption for nonbusiness
assets such as housing.7
6 Stated algebraically, a taxpayer earns $x and is subject to tax rate t. The return on

investments is i. If the investment of $x is not deductible but the yield is exempt,
taxpayer is subject to an immediate tax on $x leaving $x (1-t) to invest. The
taxpayer’s position after n years is:
$x (1-t) (1+i)n
If the taxpayer can deduct the investment, the taxpayer can invest the full
amount and the pre-tax position after n years is $x (1+i)n. The taxpayer is taxed on
the return (and the withdrawal of the investment), leaving the taxpayer with:
$x (1+i)n (1-t)
These two expressions are equivalent.
The assumptions behind the equivalence are listed in Michael Graetz,
Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1575 (1979).
Other than the assumptions concerning inframarginal returns, discussed in the text
below (i.e., that the taxpayer can immediately invest the tax savings at the same
rate of return as the original investment), the most important assumption is that
rates are not progressive (or, more narrowly, that the taxpayer stay in the same tax
bracket) and stay the same during the term of the investment.
7 As an aside, note that under a consumption tax and when the assumptions hold,
the present value of the taxpayer’s tax liability does not change regardless of when
it is paid. Similarly, the present value of the taxpayer’s consumption bundle is the
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If this equivalence holds, the cash-flow consumption tax is just a
tax on wages. The reason is there are only two sources of resources
used for consumption, labor and capital. If the return to capital is
exempt, only labor is taxed, effectively creating a wage tax (treating
all returns to labor as wages). There are, however, two major
exceptions to the cash-flow, yield-exemption equivalence.
First, a cash-flow tax taxes certain returns in excess of the
market rate of return, known as inframarginal returns. An
inframarginal return is the return from any investment opportunity
in which one cannot invest additional cash at the same rate. For
example, monopoly profits are inframarginal returns.
The intuition that a cash-flow tax taxes inframarginal returns is
that taxpayers cannot fully “gross-up” their investments by the tax
savings because the savings must be invested at a lower rate than the
original investment. The return on their investment of the tax
savings from a deduction earns only the marginal rate of return, not
the inframarginal rate. These returns will not then be sufficient to
pay the tax on the original investment (which will have grown more
quickly) when the investment is sold.
Example
The facts are the same as above in which the taxpayer earns
$100 and wants to invest it. Suppose, however, that the marginal
rate for investments is 10% but the taxpayer has an opportunity
to invest $60 at a 50% return. The remaining $40 (the tax
savings from not paying immediate tax on the earnings) must be
invested at 10%. After one year, the taxpayer has $90 from the
10% investment and $44 from the investment of the $40 of tax
savings, for a total of $134. This is fully taxable, so the tax
liability is $53.60, leaving the taxpayer with $80.40. A yieldexempt tax would leave the taxpayer with $90 (the $60 left after
tax, invested at 50%). The difference between yield-exemption
and cash-flow taxation is $9.60.
The $60 investment produced a return 40 percentage points
greater than the market return, or $24 (the $90 super-return is
same regardless of when he consumes. In this sense, the consumption tax is said
not to distort the timing of consumption (and correspondingly, the decision to
save). This is one reason for adoption of the consumption tax put forth by its
advocates.
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more than the $66 regular return on the same $60 investment by
$24). A tax on this excess would be $9.60, which is difference
between total exemption of the yield and cash flow taxation.
Thus, cash flow taxation taxes the return in excess of the
marginal return.8
It is not clear what portion of investments produce
inframarginal returns.9 Inframarginal investments are not just
investments that produce extraordinary returns. Instead, they are
investments in which one cannot invest additional money at the
same rate. So a risky start-up business may not produce
inframarginal returns as additional cash would be welcome. Instead,
they may produce large returns to human capital (i.e., talent or skill)
and to risk. But if we cannot adequately police the border between
8 Note that another way to view the example is view the government as

demanding a portion of the inframarginal investment (equal to the tax rate). This
forces the investor to put less money into the inframarginal investment and more
into marginal investments, which reduces the investor’s returns. For example,
using the numbers above, the investor would be viewed as investing $36 in the
inframarginal investment, getting a deduction for this investment and grossing up
the deduction for a total investment of $60, $24 of which is really the
government’s. When the investment is sold, the benefit of the deduction offsets
the tax leaving the investor with the inframarginal 50% return on $36 (i.e., $54).
The investor, however, has $60 to invest, so the investor invests the other $24 at
the market rate of 10 percent, and deducts the investment and is taxed sale.
Under this view, no tax is imposed on any investment but the return is lower
than in the yield exempt case because in the cash flow regime, the government gets
a share of the inframarginal investment. One might argue, then, that it is
inappropriate to say that the cash-flow tax “taxes” inframarginal returns. For
purposes of this paper, it does not matter whether it is called a tax. All that matters
is that the cash-flow regime the government gets some portion of inframarginal
returns and does not under a yield-exempt regime.
9 The only estimates that I am aware of are in William M. Gentry & R. Glenn
Hubbard, Distributional Implications of a Consumption Tax (1997).
Unfortunately, Gentry and Hubbard based their conclusions on the fact that the
ratio of fair market value to book value is higher for the wealthy. This
measure—Tobin’s q—may indicate the presence of inframarginal returns but it
may also reflect either a longer holding period and appreciation at the riskless rate
or the return to risk. See Joseph Bankman & Barbara H. Fried, Winner and
Losers in the Shift to a Consumption Tax, 86 Georgetown L. J. 539, 546 (1998)
for a discussion.
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wages and capital, so that entrepreneurs are likely to take some of
their returns to human capital in the form of a return to capital,
capture of these returns by the capital portion of the tax is
important.10
Second, depending on the particular transition rules that are
adopted, a cash-flow consumption tax would tax all existing capital
(old wealth) on a one-time (present value) basis. Consider a taxpayer
who makes a $100 investment today under the income tax. She gets
basis equal to $100. Suppose tomorrow we impose a cash-flow
consumption tax, and the next day she sells the investment for $100.
When she sells the investment, she receives $100, fully taxed under
the cash-flow consumption tax. The effect is that wealth existing on
the date the consumption tax is imposed gets taxed, regardless of
whether it had previously been taxed (had tax basis) under the
income tax.
Whether this happens depends on the transition rule for
changing to a new system. For example, if we eliminated the income
tax and imposed a broad-based retail sales tax (a type of
consumption tax), all spending for consumption would be subject to
the tax. In particular, there would be no recovery of existing income
tax basis because all purchases would be subject to the retail sales tax,
even if made out of cash from the sale assets with a high basis under
the no-longer existent income tax. If we instead imposed a yieldexempt regime, there would be no tax on existing capital as all
returns, such as our taxpayer’s receipt of $100 on the sale of her
investment, would be explicitly exempt.
While many economists treat consumption taxes as necessarily
taxing existing wealth (and taxes that do not are different types of

10 As an aside, note that an income tax exempts returns to risk-bearing. The

intuition is that taxpayers can adjust their portfolios to offset the tax. See Alvin C.
Warren, Jr., How Much Capital Income Taxed Under an Income Tax is Exempt
Under a Cash Flow Tax, 52 Tax L. Rev. 1 (1996). This return is also exempt
under the consumption tax. Thus, the only component of the return on capital
that is taxed under an income tax but not a consumption tax is the riskless return,
making the distinction between the income tax and the consumption tax very
small. See Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Is the Debate Between an
Income Tax and a Consumption Tax a Debate About Risk? Does it Matter?, 47
Tax L. Rev. 377 (1992).
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taxes),11 there is nothing inherent in the concept of consumption
that prevents us from choosing any form of transition relief desired.
For example, we can choose to allow recovery of existing income tax
basis when we switch to a consumption tax, which would reduce the
tax on existing capital to the extent it has been taxed under the
income tax (i.e., to the extent of income tax basis less liabilities). The
Flat Tax has no explicit transition rules and, therefore, will fully tax
existing wealth.12
Transition effects raise important economic, fairness, and
political issues which may cause us to allow or deny transition relief.
The common assumption in the economic literature is that taxing
old capital on transition is efficient as the tax cannot be avoided.13
As will be discussed in section __ below, however, under almost any
feasible assumptions, the transition tax will be avoidable.
Nevertheless, I will assume that the Flat Tax offers no transition
relief, consistent with the Hall Rabushka plan. This simplifies much
of the design as transition rules need not be considered.14 But given
the likelihood of some transition relief, Section __ below will briefly
discuss potential options and the pitfalls.
To summarize, a cash-flow consumption tax taxes wages,
inframarginal returns to capital and, on a one-time basis, all existing
capital. The two major differences between a cash-flow tax and a
yield-exempt tax are the tax on inframarginal returns and the tax on
11 See, for example, Jane G. Gravelle, The Flat Tax and Other Proposals: Who

will Bear the Tax Burden, Tax Notes 1517, 1521 (December 18, 1995) (arguing
that “provid[ing] relief to old capital is inconsistent with the fundamental nature of
a consumption tax.”) See also Alan J. Auerbach & Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Dynamic
Fiscal Policy. The best interpretation of their insistence that consumption tax taxes
existing wealth is that it is an attempt to impose consistency of language within
the community rather than an argument that there is something inherent in the
words “consumption tax” that require such a result.
12 See David Bradford, Fundamental Issues in Consumption Taxation (AEI press
1996), for a discussion of transition effects of switching to a consumption tax.
13 See, e.g., Alan J. Auerbach & Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Dynamic Fiscal Policy.
14 For example the transition rules are the reason for much of the complexity of
the USA tax. See Louis Kaplow, Recovery of Pre-Enactment Basis Under A
Consumption Tax: The USA Tax System __ Tax Notes 1109 (August 28, 1995);
Alvin C. Warren Jr., The Proposal for an “Unlimited Savings Allowance,” __ Tax
Notes __ (August 28, 1995).
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existing capital. A yield-exempt tax would not to tax inframarginal
returns as all returns from capital are explicitly exempt. Nor would a
yield-exempt tax impose a tax on existing capital without a special
rule doing so because the yield on all capital is explicitly exempt.15
Therefore, a yield-exempt tax taxes only wages.
B. The Flat Tax—General Background
This section will consider the general functioning of the Flat
Tax as set forth in the Hall/Rabushka book. Three points will be
made. First, the Flat Tax is a progressive consumption tax. Second,
the business level tax in the Flat Tax (described below) would exist
only to tax existing wealth and inframarginal returns. This second
point is significant as most VATs collect value added at the business
level while the Flat Tax does not. Third, the Flat Tax imposes
multiple methods of taxing capital.
Begin by considering a retail sales tax. A retail sales tax is a
direct tax on consumption purchases. If applied to all consumption
purchases in the economy, it would be a consumption tax, equivalent
in overall effect to the cash-flow tax discussed above.
The explanations of why the retail sales tax and the cash-flow
tax are consumption taxes were quite different, but it is easy to see
the connection. In a cash-flow consumption tax, the taxable amount
for a given taxpayer is equal to his consumption purchases, as
investments are deducted. Thus, the taxpayer effectively pays a tax if
he purchases a good or service. The collection mechanism is for
individual taxpayers to pay a tax on all of their consumption
purchases during the year (or other accounting period) once, in a
single tax filing. No special listing or tracking of each consumption
purchase is required. In a retail sales tax, a tax is paid when a good or
service is purchased for consumption. Businesses remit the tax, and

15 This statement is true only in the most abstract sense on an economy wide

basis. Actual transition to a yield-exempt tax might be complicated, for example,
because long-term contracts and other relationships might not immediately adjust
to the tax. For example, a yield exempt tax would probably eliminate the deduction
for interest for the borrower and not tax interest to the lender. The burden on debt
is not changed but absent immediate changes to interest rates, the switch would
create windfall winners and losers.
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the tax computed for each purchase rather than on an annual basis.
The overall effect, however, is the same.16
Next consider a valued added tax, or VAT. A VAT is simply a
complicated method of collecting a retail sales tax. A VAT collects
the tax on each good at each stage of production rather than only at
the retail level. The reason most nations impose a VAT rather than a
retail sales tax is that avoidance of a VAT is more difficult. 17
Example
Suppose Bigco creates a good from scratch and sells it in the
market. To impose a VAT or a retail sales tax, we tax the value
of the good by requiring Bigco to pay tax equal to the value of
the good times the tax rate. In this simple case, the VAT is
identical to the retail sales tax.
Suppose Bigco purchases inputs from another company. In a
VAT, the company selling the inputs would be taxed on the
value of the goods sold. Bigco would then sell the finished good
to the public and be taxed. If we taxed Bigco on the full sales
price of the good, we would double tax the good simply because
Bigco purchased its inputs from another company rather than
making the product from scratch. To prevent this, we allow
Bigco to deduct its purchases or claim a credit for the taxes paid
on the purchase, and the tax savings from the deduction or credit
offsets the tax on the seller of the input.
A deduction for purchases and an inclusion for sales means
businesses are taxed on a cash-flow basis. A VAT that allows a
deduction for purchases and an inclusion for sales is called a
16 This leaves aside many differences between the two systems. In particular, a

cash-flow tax is collected at the individual level so that taxes may be tailored to
individual circumstances (for example, by allowing deductions for special
consumption purchases such as medical services, or by imposing progressive tax
rates). The text only attempts to show rough equivalences, so that design choices
may be based on other considerations.
17 The reason that avoidance is more difficult in a VAT is that by collecting tax at
each stage of production, avoidance at one stage only eliminates a portion of the
tax. Avoidance at the retail level in a retail sales tax eliminates the entire tax. In
addition, European VATs are designed so that business purchasers have an
incentive to ensure that the seller has complied with the VAT, creating a selfpolicing mechanism. That Flat Tax would not have such a mechanism.
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“subtraction method” VAT. Note that there is no deduction for
wages and no direct tax to the workers on wages. Deductions are
allowed to prevent duplication of the tax and, therefore, should only
be allowed for goods or services purchased from a business that has
already paid the tax. Workers are not taxed, so the purchase of their
labor is not deductible. Like a retail sales tax, individuals pay the tax
only on purchases.
European countries do not impose this method of VAT.
Instead, they impose what is called a “credit-invoice” VAT. In a
credit-invoice VAT, businesses get a credit against taxes for any
taxes paid by the sellers of their inputs instead of a deduction.
Conceptually, the credit and the deduction are the same—they both
provide the same dollar offset against taxes for taxes paid by sellers of
inputs. Both types of VAT use the same method to measure
consumption. As will be discussed below, the real difference is the
use of invoices.
The Flat Tax operates like the subtraction method VAT
described above, except that it allows businesses a deduction for
wages and taxes individuals on wages. Individuals are not taxed on
investment income, just like in a VAT or sales tax. The benefit of
the Flat Tax over a VAT is that in the Flat Tax, wages can be taxed
at a progressive rate, but in a VAT they cannot because there is no
tax at the individual level. The Flat Tax, then, is a progressive
consumption tax.
Once again, the difference between a consumption tax and an
income tax is the recovery of basis. If an income tax were collected at
the business level, businesses would not get an immediate deduction
for the costs of inputs. Instead they would recover the cost over time.
The only difference between the discussion here and the discussion
of individual consumption taxes above is that here we are imposing
the tax at the business level rather than the individual level, but the
principles for measuring (and taxing) consumption in the economy
are the same regardless of where the tax is collected.
Thus, the crucial feature of the Flat Tax that makes it a tax on
consumption is the immediate write-offs for expenditures. If the Flat
Tax required businesses to depreciate assets based on their economic
life, the Flat Tax would measure income. This type of tax has been
labeled variously as an “income VAT” or, the Comprehensive
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Business Income Tax (CBIT). Note also that one might be cautious
in designing the Flat Tax around expensing as it would be an easy
change in the future for Congress to require depreciation. The
design should, if possible, be sufficiently robust to cover this
possibility.
Given that the Flat Tax has an explicit wage tax, and that a
consumption tax taxes wages, inframarginal returns and existing
capital, the only reason for the business level tax must be to collect
the tax on existing capital and inframarginal returns.18 This is
significantly different than the European systems, in which the
business level tax taxes valued added, and exemption from the
business level tax has effects other than on transition or on
inframarginal returns.
The business level tax does not apply to all capital. While the
businesses are not defined by Hall and Rabushka or generally in the
introduced bills, not all capital will be treated as held by a business in
any likely definition. For example, personal residences, consumer
durables, collectibles owned by individuals, and assets such as land or
commodities held by individuals purely as investments are unlikely to
be treated as part of a business. These assets represent a significant
portion of capital in the United States. Personal residences alone are
22 percent of the capital stock.19 The return on these assets is
explicitly exempt instead of being subject to the business cash-flow
tax. Because these assets are exempt from the business tax, they are
not subject to the transition tax or the tax on any inframarginal
returns.
Having multiple methods of taxing capital creates distributional
and efficiency issues. Not imposing the transition tax and the tax on
inframarginal returns on capital held outside of a trade or business
means the overall tax on capital is lower, and more of the tax burden
18 Another possible reason for the business tax is to prevent shifting of wage

income into business income. If only wages were taxed, individuals could have
firms retain part of the wage income and pay it out as dividends or capital gains.
Gordon and MacKie-Mason show that in the presence of shifting, the business
rate and the individual rate ideally are the same. Gordon and MacKie-Mason,
Why Is there Corporate Income Taxation in a Small Open Economy?, 67 The
Effects of Taxation on Multinational Corporations (1994).
19 See Congressional Budget Office, The Economic Effects of Comprehensive
Tax Reform, 39, Table 3, (1997).
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will necessarily fall on labor. In addition, if the reason the transition
tax is efficient is because it is unavoidable, not imposing the tax on
all assets will reduce its efficiency because it will be avoidable.
To summarize, the Flat Tax is a progressive consumption tax,
collected at the individual level for wages and at the business level for
existing capital and inframarginal returns. The key to the Flat Tax
taxing consumption is the cash-flow mechanism at the business
level, which allows expensing rather than capitalization and
depreciation. Progressivity is created through the progressive tax on
wages. Non-business capital is taxed under the yield exempt method
so the Flat Tax imposes multiple methods of taxing capital.
C. Some Important Details of the Flat Tax
There are several additional details of the Flat Tax necessary to
understanding and designing the system. The most important of
these is what I will call the “openness” of the Flat Tax. By openness,
I mean that the Flat Tax allows deductions by businesses that are not
necessarily offset by corresponding inclusions elsewhere. For
example, a business may deduct the cost of land purchased from an
individual, but the individual is not taxed on the sale.
Credit-invoice VATs, by contrast, are generally “closed,” in the
sense that credits are only allowed for purchases from taxpayers
under the invoice mechanism. In a closed system, transactions
generally have no net tax effect unless they are consumption
purchases because businesses may claim credits only if there is an
offsetting tax somewhere else in the system. This is consistent with
the structure of a VAT which is designed so that credits or
deductions offset tax liability at earlier stages in production. Only
when the good or service is ultimately purchased to be consumed is
there a net tax on a transaction.
The openness of the Flat Tax stems from two sources: the lack
of invoices for domestic transactions and the treatment of
international transactions, each of which is discussed below. In
addition, the Flat Tax treatment of financial instruments, pensions,
losses and several other items are briefly described.
1. Lack of Invoices
Recall that the Flat Tax has multiple regimes for taxing capital.
The cash-flow regime applies to all assets used in a trade or business.
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Assets not used in a trade or business, for example, land or durable
assets held by individuals, are taxed under a yield-exempt method.
The openness of the Flat Tax comes from the interaction of
these two regimes and, in particular, the lack of an invoice system
governing the treatment of assets that switch between the regimes.
Suppose an individual owns land worth $100 on the transition date.
At some later date, a business buys the land for $100 and then resells
it to a third party for $100. If the purchase is nondeductible (because
the system is closed and a nontaxpayer was the seller), the business
has gross receipts of $100 on the sale of the land and no deduction
on the purchase, so its net receipts are $100 and it pays tax on $100.
If the purchase is deductible (because the system is open), the
business has no tax liability as the $100 deduction for the purchase
offsets the $100 receipt on sale. Thus, the closed system taxes the
full value of the land held by the individual while the open system
exempts the value of the land held by the individual. The difference
between the open and closed systems is the transition tax. Closed
systems impose a transition tax on assets that switch from nonbusiness to business use while open systems do not impose a tax on
these assets.20
Realistically, the value of the land will vary between the
transition date and the time the individual sells it to the business and
between the time the business buys it and sells it. These fluctuations
in value do not affect the conclusion. For example, if the land
20 There are some qualifications to this conclusion. For example, closed and open

systems are different on the resale of used goods. Suppose a consumer purchases a
car subject to the Flat Tax and then resells the car to a used car dealer. Tax was
paid once by the individual. If the car dealer cannot deduct the purchase price of
the used car, a double tax is imposed when the dealer sells the car. If the dealer can
deduct the purchase price of the used car, only a single tax is imposed on the use
(by two different individuals) of the car. To avoid the double tax created by a
closed system, European VATs have special rules for used goods. An open system
would require no special rules.
Similarly, an individual might create a capital asset after the transition tax
and sell it to a business. Open and closed systems will tax the sale differently and
the open system will allow the return to the individual’s efforts, the labor earnings,
go untaxed. The difference, however, depends entirely on whether the creation of
the capital asset by the individual is treated as a business. The discussion in the
text below highlights the problems with the definition of a business in an open
system.
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changes value while held by the individual, the expected present
value of the land on the transition date will still be $100 and the
expected present value of the tax in the closed system will be the tax
on $100. If the land appreciates in value while held by the business,
the appreciation is subject to the cash flow mechanism which will
exempt normal returns and tax inframarginal returns. Thus, the net
effect of the closed system as compared to the open system is to
impose a transition tax on assets held by nontaxpayers on the
transition date that are ultimately used in a trade or business.
The example above used an individual. But nontaxpayers
potentially include foreigners (explored below), charities,
governments, special classes of businesses such as small businesses, as
well as individuals. In addition, most systems are not completely
open or completely closed. European VATs are generally closed but
often have special classes of nontaxpaying businesses purchases from
which are deductible.21 The Japanese consumption tax is open
domestically but closed internationally. The Hall and Rabushka
system is completely open but could be partially open instead. Note
also that other literature, particularly that by Charles McLure, calls a
closed VAT “sophisticated,” and an open VAT “naive.”22 I prefer
the less weighted terms open and closed.
The decision to have an open tax will have distributional and
efficiency effects. For example, if the tax is closed, assets that switch
to business use after the transition date will be subject to the
transition tax while if the tax is open, assets that switch regimes will
not be affected. The additional transition tax imposed by a closed
system may be inefficient because the tax is avoidable (it is based on
a decision to shift assets from personal to business use). But an open
system creates an incentive to shift assets to non-taxpayers
immediately prior to transition and shift them back after transition
and, therefore, makes the transition tax less efficient. It is not clear
without more which system is more efficient. Similarly, reducing the
size of the transition tax by having an open system will have
21 In VAT terminology, these businesses are known as “zero rated.” They are

treated as paying tax at a zero rate so that the are taxpayers for purposes of the
closed system.
22 Charles E. McLure, Jr., The Valued-Added Tax, Key to Deficit Reduction?
(1987) at 71-79.
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distributive effects as the transition tax falls on current wealth
holders. Reducing the size of the tax means the tax burden
necessarily falls more on labor.
The major advantage of an open system is that, at least at the
surface level, it is cheaper to administer. In a closed system, each
purchase has to be traced to a particular seller, and the business has
to verify that the seller is a taxpayer. Effectively, invoices and tax
registration are required in a closed system, exactly as in creditinvoice method VATs. Conceivably, the Flat Tax could be closed in
which case many of the administrative and implementation issues
would be similar to those of a European system. The Hall and
Rabushka plan, however, is open and to highlight the administrative
issues in the Hall and Rabushka plan, I will assume for the
remainder of this paper that the system is open with respect to
payments to domestic non-taxpayers.
Many of the implementation issues for the Flat Tax arise from
its openness. While detailed examination of specific issues is left for
Section __ below, some examples of how the open system affects
design are useful here to show how pervasive the issue is.
Consider first the treatment of financial transactions. As
discussed below, the Flat Tax does not allow deductions for
payments on financial instruments and correspondingly, does not
require an inclusion for receipts from financial instruments. For
example, interest is not deductible by the payor and not includible by
the recipient. Consider the treatment of a simple financial
instrument, a contract to purchase fungible property in the future.
Example: Forward contracts
A business and an individual enter into a contract in which
the business promises to purchase property for $100 in six
months (a long forward contract). The forward can be settled in
cash or property, at the election of the business. If the value of
the property has gone up, the contract is settled in cash, creating
no income to the business as the cash is from a financial
transaction. If the value of the property has gone down, the
contract is settled by delivery of the property (and subsequent
resale by the business into the market), which produces a
deduction for the business.
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Half the time (when the value of the property has gone down),
the business will have deductible loss. The other half of the time, the
business will have exempt gain. Thus, a contract that has no
expected economic value will generate expected tax losses. Moreover,
the parties can take offsetting short and long positions in the same
commodity (a straddle). The parties would then have no risk and the
business would always ends up with a deduction (on the long if the
property value goes down and on the short if the property value goes
up). Given that no risk is involved, businesses can use this
transaction to eliminate business taxes at any time by simply doing it
in greater size.
This transaction works because the Flat Tax is open (and
ignores financial transactions). If the tax were closed, the purchase of
the asset from the individual or other non-taxpayer would not be
deductible, solving the problem. European VAT’s, for example, do
not have problems with this transaction as they are closed. Many
other problems with the taxation of financial transactions are the
result of the openness of the Flat Tax.
Second, consider valuation problems created by an open system.
An individual who owns a profitable business could sell an asset to
the business for a wildly inflated price (with payment made with
funds loaned to the business by the individual). The business could
claim a deduction and individual would have no corresponding
inclusion. This means the government has to police the price of sales
between businesses and owners in an open system. Effectively
transfer pricing problems familiar in the international income tax
context become prevalent domestically in the Flat Tax.
Third, consider the treatment of losses. European VATs allow
full refundability of losses. That is, the government makes a payment
to businesses that have credits in excess of their tax liability. This is
necessary to ensure that the net result of transactions between
businesses is zero (with tax paid only on purchases by consumers
from businesses). If the system is open so that invoices are
meaningless, the possibility of losses being claimed improperly all
but precludes full refundability of losses. The individual described
above who mispriced an asset to offset taxes paid by the business
could, if losses were refundable, require the government to write
checks. This is generally viewed as intolerable, and Hall and
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Rabushka therefore proposed that losses not be refundable. Instead,
losses are carried forward increased each year by a very low interest
rate.
Nonrefundability of losses, however, creates enormous
administrative problems as transactions purely between businesses
can generate tax. For example, suppose a business forms a subsidiary
that will engage in a speculative research venture that will not
produce profits until far into the future. If the business contributes
assets to the subsidiary and the contribution is treated as a taxable
sale or exchange, the business would have an inclusion equal to the
value of the assets but the subsidiary would have nonrefundable
losses. This means special rules, such as current law nonrecognition
rules, will be needed to prevent mistaxation of these types of
transactions. Effectively, large portions of the current corporate or
partnership tax rules might have to be incorporated into the Flat
Tax.
Finally, consider the treatment of small businesses. Suppose that
for administrative reasons, small businesses are exempt from tax
(discussed in Section _ below). Consider a small business that
provides services to larger businesses, say a small law firm or
computer support firm. That is, the small business operates at the
wholesale rather than retail level. Suppose the price of the inputs
(including wages) of the small firm is $100 and it charges $110 for
the services. The small firm cannot deduct the cost of its inputs
although the seller of the inputs will pay tax. Effectively, exemption
from tax means the small business is treated as consumer of its
inputs.
If the tax system is open, the purchasing businesses will deduct
the $110 cost of the services. This deduction covers not only the $10
of value added by the small business but the $100 of deductions for
inputs of the small business which the small business could not
deduct because it was exempt. The net benefit of exemption in an
open system is the tax on the value added by the exempt business.
If the tax system is closed, the large business gets no deduction
for the $110 purchase. If it resells the product for $110, all $110
gross receipts are taxed. That is, the both $10 value added by the
small business and the $100 of inputs used by the small business are
taxed. But the $100 of inputs to the small business were already
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taxed because the exempt small business could not deduct their costs
on purchase (and the seller presumably had taxable receipts). This
means the inputs of small businesses operating at the wholesale level
are double taxed.23 This is why small business exemptions in the
European system are used almost entirely by retail businesses, and
other small businesses often elect to be taxed: for wholesale business,
being taxed results in lower net tax payments than exemption!
These examples show that the openness of the system will affect
many design decisions, making some, such as the treatment of
financial instruments and losses, more difficult, and some, such as
the treatment of small businesses, easier.
2. International Operation of the Flat Tax
The Flat Tax is unique in its treatment of international
transactions because it taxes exports and exempts imports. As
explained below, all other VATs exempt exports and tax imports.
Although one might initially think that the difference is
economically important because of the effects on imports and
exports, it turns out, the most important implication is that this
treatment makes the tax open internationally. This section describes
the Flat Tax’s international system and the economics behind it.
Design issues are sketched in this section and are discussed in more
detail in Section __ below.
a. Background
The Flat Tax, as described by Hall and Rabushka, is a
territorial, origin-based consumption tax. A territorial tax does not
tax foreign earnings, dividends, or interest of U.S. taxpayers. By
contrast, the current income tax taxes worldwide income of U.S.
taxpayers (although the taxation of the income is often deferred until
repatriated). Territorial jurisdiction is typical of consumption taxes
imposed throughout the world.
Under an origin-based consumption tax, a taxpayer gets a
deduction for imports and pays tax on exports. This treatment
applies whether there is a cross-border purchase or sale or the
business simply ships the good across the border to a branch (in
which case the deduction or income would be based on a
23 Small businesses operating at the retail level do not have this problem in a

closed system as there is no resale by the purchasing consumer.
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hypothetical sale at fair market value at the border.) Effectively, the
tax is imposed on domestic production, regardless where the product
is consumed.
Example
Export. An automobile is produced domestically and sold to
a retailer in Germany for resale and use in Germany. When the
car is exported, a tax is imposed on the sale of the car just like
any other sale by the business. The value of the production in the
U.S. is taxed, but any value added in Germany, for example,
through retailing, is not taxed by the U.S.
Import. A German automobile is purchased by a U.S.
retailer for resale in the U.S. The retailer deducts the cost of the
purchase, like any other business purchase. Only the value added
in the U.S. by the retailer would be taxed (i.e., the difference
between the price paid by the retailer and the sales price to the
consumer).
The Flat Tax is open internationally because it is origin based.
The German car maker is not subject to the Flat Tax when it sells
the sale of the car to the U.S. retailer, so the retailer gets a deduction
when there is no offsetting inclusion.
No existing VAT is origin-based.24 Instead, VATs are
uniformly imposed on a destination basis. Under a destination-based
tax, imports are not deductible and exports are not taxable. The tax
base in a destination-based tax is domestic consumption.
Example
Export. Under a destination-based tax, the same car sold in
Germany would bear no U.S. tax. Under a subtraction method
tax, like the Flat Tax, no tax would be imposed on the sale but
the selling business would still get a deduction for its inputs,
effectively eliminating any tax imposed at prior levels of
production.
Import. If a car is imported into the U.S., no deduction is
allowed to the importer. When the importer sells the car, the
24 See Stephen E. Shay and Victoria P. Summers, Selected International Aspects

of Fundamental Tax Reform Proposals, 51 Miami L. Rev. 1029, 1047 (1997)
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receipts are taxes, so that the full value of the consumption in the
U.S. is taxed here.

In the above example, Germany will probably impose a
destination-based consumption tax. Thus, if the U.S. imposes an
origin-based tax and Germany imposes a destination based tax, a car
exported to Germany from the United States will bear U.S. tax and
German tax. If the car were produced in Germany and sold in the
U.S., then Germany would not impose a tax under its destinationbased system and the U.S. would also not impose a tax under its
origin-based system. U.S. exports, therefore, bear a double tax and
imports bear no tax. (Note that this leaves aside questions about
foreign income taxes.) This is obviously not the strongest political
selling point of the Flat Tax.
Economists argue, however, that exchange rates will adjust to
eliminate adverse effects (so long as the tax is imposed uniformly
among on all goods in the economy). This argument is summarized
below. The major design issue created by an origin-based system is
that the system is open and the problems created by an international
open system are largely the same as those highlighted above
domestically. The follow sections discusses the basics of the
economic analysis.
i. Destination-based consumption taxes do not alter international
cash flows relative to a world with no taxes.
Consider the initial imposition of a uniform destination-based
VAT. All prices in the economy would increase by the tax. There
would, however, be no effect on trade flows. All taxes would be
removed on export, so producers could export goods without tax, and
exports would not be affected. Imports would bear a tax, but so
would all competing goods, so relative prices would remain
unchanged, and imports would not be affected either.
ii. Origin-based taxes are equivalent on the margin to destinationbased taxes.
Suppose the destination-based consumption tax were replaced
with an origin-based consumption tax. Now a tax is imposed on
exports making the U.S. goods more expensive than other goods,
and no tax is imposed on imports making foreign goods cheaper
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than U.S. goods. This will mean there will be less demand for U.S.
dollars by foreigners and more demand for foreign currency by U.S.
nationals. Relative to other currencies, the dollar will weaken and,
given consumers preferences for U.S. and foreign goods, the change
in the value of the dollar will eliminate the effect of the tax.25
25 Al Warren gives the following example of switching from an origin to a

destination based tax to illustrate the equivalence.
Suppose that the U.S. has an origin-based VAT of 10 percent with no
border adjustments, and that a U.S. consumer product which costs $100 to
produce will sell for $110, including the tax, whether sold in the U.S. or for
export. Assume that a comparable product is produced in country Z and sells
for 110Z in the local zed currency. Assume further that the exchange rate
between the U.S. dollar and the Z zed is $1 = 1Z. Finally, for simplicity
assume that there are no transportation costs for shipping the products.
Under these conditions, consumers in the U.S. and Z will choose
between the two products on the assumption that they will sell for identical
prices. Consumers in Z have the choice of buying the Z product for 110Z or
buying the U.S. product for $110, which will require 110Z. Similarly, the
U.S. consumers can buy either product for $110. A U.S. producer has the
choice of selling in the U.S. market for $110 or exporting for 110Z, which
will yield $110. In either case, the U.S. product will retain $100 after
payment of taxes.
What will happen if the U.S. replaces its origin-based VAT with a
destination- based VAT that exempts exports and taxes imports? Initially,
the Z product appears more expensive to U.S. consumers than the U.S.
product because the Z product will sell for $121 (the old price of $110 plus
the new 10 percent tax) whereas the U.S. will still sell for $110. Similarly, the
U.S. product now looks less expensive than the Z product to country Z
consumers, because the tax rebate means that the U.S. product can now be
exported from the U.S. for $100. The U.S. producer might therefore think it
has an advantage in Z, where the comparable local product continues to sell
for 110Z. Hence it is often argued that a destination-based VAT would
stimulate exports and that an origin-based VAT would not.
Now consider what happens when the U.S. and Z consumers start to
switch from Z products to U.S. products because the latter appear less
expensive. That switch would mean that there would be less demand for the
Z currency by U.S. nationals (who are reducing their imports of the Z
products) and more demand for the U.S. currency by Z nationals (who are
increasing their imports of the U.S. product). Given this change in demand,
the value of the dollar will rise relative to the zed until there is no longer any
advantage to switching from Z products to U.S. products, given consumer’s
preferences relating to matters other than price, which preferences are
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These currency adjustments are not intuitive to most people.
The double taxation of exports and the zero taxation of imports will
be immediately obvious to any observer but there will be no easy way
to prove that currencies have adjusted. We will have to rely on the
economists’ logic and, potentially, complex empirical studies. Thus,
despite economist’s assurances, origin-based taxes like the Flat Tax
are likely to face serious political problems.
Also note that the logic only applies to uniform taxes.
Inevitably, some goods will not be taxed (e.g., goods sold by small
businesses or any good given a special preference). Currency prices,
however, will only adjust in the aggregate to the overall level of
taxation. Thus, a sector of the economy that is taxed more heavily
than the economy as a whole would be disadvantaged under the
origin-based tax and a sector that is taxed more lightly would be at
an advantage.
iii. Origin-based and destination-based taxes differ with respect to
inframarginal returns and the transition tax.
An origin-based tax taxes inframarginal returns on inbound
investments and imposes a transition tax on foreign investors in U.S.
assets. A destination-based tax taxes inframarginal returns on

independent of the tax law. In this simple example, the value of the dollar
would rise until $1 could be exchanged for 1.1Z.
U.S. consumers would then have the choice between buying the U.S.
product for $110 (including the tax) or the Z product for $100 (which would
be exchanged for 110Z) plus the 10 percent tax on imports, for a total of
$110. Z consumers would have the choice between buying the Z product for
110Z or the U.S. product for $100, which would require 110Z. Similarly,
U.S. producers would be indifferent between selling in Z or domestically.
Taking into account the change in exchange rates brought about by the
change in the relative prices of the U.S. and Z products due to the
introduction of border adjustments, the destination-based VAT has no
advantage over the origin-based VAT in terms of stimulating exports. One
of the U.S. products exchanges for one of the Z products in both the U.S.
and country Z under both taxes, and the U.S. producer earns the same
amount from a sale at home and a sale abroad under either tax.
Michael Graetz attributes this example to Al Warren, but does not provide a
citation. See Michael J. Graetz, International Aspects of Fundamental Tax
Restructuring: Practice or Principle, 51 U. Miami L. Rev. 1093 (1997).
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outbound investments and imposes a transition tax on U.S. taxpayers
investing abroad.
Consider inframarginal returns first. Suppose that a U.S.
corporation makes an investment abroad. Say it builds a plant abroad
to produce goods sold here. Under a destination-based tax, any U.S.
tax is rebated at the border and any import is taxed at the border.
Effectively, the export of the plant is deducted and the import of the
goods produced by the plant are taxed. Destination-based taxes give
cash-flow treatment to foreign investments. An origin-based tax
does not allow a deduction for exports and does not tax imports and,
therefore, gives yield-exempt treatment. Following the usual
difference between cash-flow and yield-exempt taxes, if there are
inframarginal returns, the corporation bears a tax under the
destination principle but not under the origin principle.
The same analysis, flipped, applies for inbound investments.
Foreign businesses bear a tax on inframarginal returns on
investments in the U.S. under an origin-based tax but not under a
destination-based tax.
The transition effects are more complex because they depend on
relative price changes. Grubert and Newlon argue that origin-based
taxes impose a transition tax on foreign investments in the United
States and destination-based taxes impose a transition tax on U.S.
investments abroad. Their analysis, however, depends on
adjustments in the domestic price level in response to the imposition
of the tax. It is generally thought that the imposition of a VAT will
cause an immediate increase in prices by the amount of the VAT,
which means their analysis may be correct for VATs. But because
the Flat Tax allows a deduction for wages, the price level change may
not occur. Consequently, transition incidence may change.26
One can say much more about the international economic
effects of the Flat Tax, but this is sufficient to consider design issues.
One important question remaining is why the Flat Tax is originbased if all other VATs are destination-based. The answer
technically appears to be the GATT, although one suspects cosmetic
issues of design also play a role.
26 See Jane Gravelle, The Flat Tax and Other Proposals: Who will Bear the Tax

Burden, __ Tax Notes 1517 (December 18, 1995).

27

Ironing Out the Flat Tax

b. Why is the Flat Tax Origin-Based?
GATT 1994 imposes conditions on tax rebates on the export of
goods to prevent nations from using tax rebates to create export
subsidies. Generally, the GATT allows rebates for indirect taxes but
prohibits rebates for direct taxes.27 The Flat Tax would probably be
a direct tax because it taxes wages at the individual level.28 Thus,
even though the Flat Tax is economically identical to a VAT (with a
cash payment to individuals based on family size), which is an
indirect tax, it is treated as a direct tax and may not grant border
rebates under the GATT (i.e., it must be origin-based).
If the U.S. were truly serious about the Flat Tax and wanted it
to be destination-based, one can imagine some accommodation at
the international level. It would be difficult for other nations to insist
on a distinction that makes no economic sense in the face of U.S.
pressure. A second reason for the origin basis of the Flat Tax,
however, is cosmetics. Hall and Rabushka have styled the Flat Tax as
an income tax and frequently refer to it as an income tax, under the
apparent assumption that this helps politically. Adopting an originbased system makes it look like an income tax. Moreover, it means
there are fewer changes from current law. The question is whether
this cosmetic difference is worth the disadvantages: being
inconsistent with other consumption taxes, relying on currency
adjustments to avoid adverse effects on U.S. exports, and, being open
internationally.
c. Effects on Design
The effects of the Flat Tax’s international tax system on the
design of the tax are discussed in Section __ below. It is worth
pointing out here that the most important implication of an originbased tax on the design of the tax system is that it is open. The
effects are similar to those of having an open system domestically: for
example, an open system has transfer pricing issues, problems with
losses, and difficulty taxing financial transactions. Allowing the
system to be open internationally, however, compounds the effect
because foreign businesses and their large, concentrated pools of
capital are exempt. Problems with financial products and transfer
27 See Shay and Summers, at 1054.
28 See Shay and Summers, at 1054.
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pricing compound significantly merely because of the potential to
increase their size and sophistication.
3. Additional Details of the Flat Tax
Hall and Rabushka provide a number of additional details for
the Flat Tax. To give a more complete sense of the tax, the most
important of these details are briefly described below, but further
discussion will be taken up in the next or following sections.
• Interest is not deductible by borrowers and not taxed to
lenders. More generally, financial transactions are ignored,
generating neither deductions nor inclusions. Only real
transactions are subject to the cash flow tax. The resulting
system, used in all VATs, is known as an R-based system.
• Pensions are deducted by businesses when earned by an
employee but not included by employees until paid (i.e., at
retirement).
• Fringe benefits are not included by employees (as roughly
true under current
• State and local governments and, roughly, charities as
defined under current law, are exempt from tax.
• Businesses withhold taxes on wages.
• Losses are not refundable, but can be carried forward
indefinitely with interest (i.e., unused losses increase each year
by an interest rate).
II. Six Major Design Issues
The number of individual design issues presented by the Flat
Tax is too vast to cover in a single paper of reasonable length. To get
a sense of the overall system, this section considers six issues: (i)
financial transactions; (ii) losses and structure of the business tax;
(iii) accounting methods; (iv) international transactions; (v) small
businesses; and (vi) the distinction between consumption and
investment. The first four are chosen because they are the core of
modern business tax planning and are responsible for much of the
complexity of the current tax law. Because of the complexity of the
issues raised by these transactions, the discussion here is necessarily
an overview. Small businesses raise extremely difficult and somewhat
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unique issues in the Flat Tax and are worth close examination.
Finally, the distinction between consumption and investment is
complex under current law and one would expect exactly the same
issues to arise in a consumption tax as the same distinctions must be
made. Hall and Rabushka claim a simple resolution of this
distinction and it is worth seeing if their claim is correct. These six
issues, therefore, should give a good sense of the overall
administrative and compliance issues in the Flat Tax. Other issues,
which may be equally important, are discussed much more briefly in
the next section.
A. Financial Instruments
As noted above, the Flat Tax, like a VAT, is R-based, which
means it does not allow deductions for payments on financial
instruments and correspondingly, does not require an inclusion for
receipts from financial instruments. Thus, interest and dividends are
not deductible to payors and not includible to recipients. The
nominal tax on a financial investment, therefore, is on the operating
business rather than on the investor. For example, if an individual
lends a business $100 at a 10 percent interest rate, the individual
investor has no nominal tax liability but the business will not be able
to deduct the interest and, therefore, will have nominal tax liability
on the amounts it earns with the $100.
Because the Flat Tax is R-based, it must distinguish between
payments on financial instruments and payments on other
investments. If the Flat Tax does not properly distinguish between
these two, taxpayers may be able to shift the tax on investments. For
example, interest can be disguised as another type of cash flow that is
deductible. This shifts the nominal tax on the interest to the investor
contrary to the premise of the R-based system.
The ability to shift the tax on the return to an investment is a
particular problem in an open system because a deduction to the
business (for disguised interest) will not necessarily be offset by an
inclusion to the lender. Thus, to the extent the Flat Tax imposes a
tax on an investment (say because the return is inframarginal or on
transition), shifting the nominal liability to a nontaxpayer avoids the
tax. For example, in the case of disguised interest, the business will
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be able to deduct the disguised interest but the lender will have no
inclusion.29
The Flat Tax, therefore, will need a set of rules designed to
distinguish the return on financial instruments from the return on
goods and services. This distinction, however, is not coherent.
Investments, whether financial or real, produce expected cash flows.
There is little difference in theory in the two types of cash flows.
Financial investments are ultimately (often through a series of
intermediaries) investments in productive assets and the overall
expected cash flows have to be the same. This means any set of rules
in the Flat Tax that distinguish between financial and real returns
will be manipulable.
The current income tax has some rules that distinguish financial
returns from other others. For example, many rules apply only to
positions in actively traded property, which, on a rough basis,
describes many financial instruments.30 Moreover, current law
attempts to identify disguised interest in some situations.31 But these
rules are not complete and do not need to be because the current tax
does not have the same dichotomy between the two types of
payments. The Flat Tax, effectively, will need many of the current
rules for identifying interest and other financial flows plus a host of
additional rules to complete the regime. These rules would be
complex, given the wide variety of ways financial and real flows can
be intertwined. Given the lack of conceptual coherence, the Flat Tax
is also likely to need anti-arbitrage rules. Similar types of cash flows
can be created through financial and real assets. These cash flows
will have different tax treatments which can be used in an arbitrage.
On the other hand, the timing of payments is less important in
the Flat Tax so many of the current law rules on timing of income
from financial instruments can be eliminated. (Section _ below
29 Note that switching to an R-based tax from the current system will create

dislocations even when the total tax on a transaction is the same. For example,
under current law, interest is deductible to the borrower and includible by the
lender and in an R-based tax, it is neither deductible nor includible. The total tax
on a lending transaction remains the same. But a borrower with an existing, longterm obligation must pay interest based on a rate set under the prior regime. These
dislocations are discussed in Section _ below.
30 See, e.g., sections 1092 and 1234A.
31 See, e.g., section 7872.
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discusses accounting methods and discusses when timing can be
important in the Flat Tax.) Moreover, the capital gain and loss rules
for financial instruments can be eliminated in the Flat Tax. There
will clearly be some simplifications that can be made. The net effect
is probably close to a wash—the Flat Tax rules will have to be about
as complex as those of current law.
To make this discussion more concrete, this section will
consider four examples which illustrate the problem of
distinguishing financial from real flows. The first example given in
Section _ above is illustrative of the problems with an R-Based, open
system for financial instruments.
Example: Forward contracts
A business and an individual or foreigner enter into a
contract in which the business promises to purchase property for
$100 in six months (a long forward). The forward can be settled
in cash or property, at the election of the business. If the value of
the property has gone up, the contract is settled in cash, creating
no income to the business because the cash is from a financial
transaction. If the value of the property has gone down, the
contract is settled by delivery of the property (and subsequent
resale by the business into the market), which produces a
deduction for the business.
Half the time (when the value of the property has gone down),
the business will have deductible loss. The other half of the time, the
business will have exempt gain. Thus, a contract that has no
expected economic value will generate expected tax losses. Moreover,
the transaction can be done as a straddle, so that the business is both
long and short the same commodity. The parties would then have no
risk and the business would always ends up with a deduction (on the
long if the property value goes down and on the short if the property
value goes up). Given that no risk is involved, businesses can use this
transaction to eliminate business taxes at any time by simply doing it
in greater size.
This transaction works because the Flat Tax is R-based and
open. If for example, the tax were not R-based, the transaction
would be treated symmetrically regardless of whether the business
settled with cash or with property. Businesses could no longer
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generate exempt gain. (This is why the transaction is not a serious
problem under current law.) Similarly, if the tax system were closed,
the purchase of the asset from the individual or other non-taxpayer
would not be deductible, again solving the problem. European
VAT’s, for example, do not have problems with this transaction
because they are closed.
The solution is to separate the payment into its financial and
real elements. For example, the Flat Tax could treat assets as
purchased for their fair market value on the purchase date, regardless
of the price paid. Any difference between the fair market value of the
asset and the price paid would be due to financial transactions and be
nondeductible to the buyer and exempt to the seller. This approach
solves the problem but requires valuation. In addition, it would be
complex for everyday business transactions such as long-term fixed
price contracts. Perhaps for certain contracts closely related to
purchases of inventory, businesses could agree to treat all payments
on the contract as payments for a physical good, which would
eliminate the electively present in the example. One can imagine the
details of this regime can be worked out but would be complex.
Example: Installment purchase by an individual from a business
An individual purchases a $100 good from a business by
promising to pay $110 in one year. The transaction is
documented as the purchase of a $90 good with $20 of interest.
By overstating interest on the sale, the business reduces its
taxable receipts while not changing its cash flows. In the example,
the business reduces taxable receipts by $10 as compared to a true
statement of the interest in the transaction. The individual on the
other side of the transaction is indifferent because no payment on
the transaction is deductible. The parties, therefore, do not have
adverse interests and there is a strong incentive to mischaracterize
the transactions.
Correctly identifying the interest element in the transaction will
not be easy because the parties often will have no incentive to
negotiate a true interest rate. For example, in a typical retail
installment sale (the purchase of furniture on credit), there is not
likely to be a comparable, nondistorted price to use to determine the
true price. Determining the true price would involve some measure
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of profitability of sellers or the appropriate interest rate. One can
imagine solutions that involve publishing maximum interest rates for
various types of loans but any such solution would be complex.
In the next example, the cash flows are in the opposite
direction—instead of a purchase by an individual from a business,
there is a purchase by a business from an individual. The strategy,
therefore, is to understate interest rather than overstate interest.
Example: Installment sale from individual to business
A business purchases property from an individual for use in
a trade or business for immediate delivery. The property is worth
$100 today and the business promises to pay the seller $110 next
year. The transaction is documented as a purchase for $110
without any payment of interest.
This transaction involves an implicit loan. Effectively, the
business borrowed $100 from the seller at a 10% interest rate. If we
are to separate the interest element from the purchase of the physical
property, we would give the business an immediate deduction for the
$100 purchase and no deduction for the $10 of interest.
If we tax the business on a cash flow basis we produce the same
present value result. The business would get no deduction for the
purchase until it paid cash. But paying $110 next year is the same as
paying $100 today, so the business is indifferent between the two
methods and, therefore, documentation does not generally matter in
this case.
The reason policymakers might care about this transaction is
that it allows businesses effectively to elect to treat loans on a cashflow basis. This allows businesses to shift the return to the financial
investment to individuals contrary to the basic decision to have an
R-based tax. Given the equivalence between yield-exempt and cashflow taxes, policymakers should only care where the equivalence does
not hold, namely in the presence of inframarginal returns. For
example, if the interest rate were not just 10% interest, but instead
was contingent on a return, allowing cash flow treatment would
allow shifting of inframarginal returns to yield-exempt individuals.
Note also that any problems presented here, such as non-taxation of
inframarginal returns, would be eliminated if the tax system were
closed.
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Example: Arbitrage
Preliminary Example: Sale of property and repurchase
A business sells property to an individual for $100 and
promises to repurchase the property next year for $110.32
Effectively, the business has borrowed $100 at 10% on a
nonrecourse, collateralized basis. Because the loan is documented as
two transactions in property, the business is taxed on a cash flow
basis.
This transaction is similar to the first example of the forward
contract—it involves a similar forward purchase of property for a
fixed price. But the tax planning goals are different. In this
transaction, the goal is to separate the interest element in the return
to a physical investment from the risk element. By separating the
interest element in a physical asset, this transaction allows interest to
be taxed on a cash–flow basis. The proposed solution to forward
contract above was to treatment the risk element in the financial
contract as a financial return. This solution does not change the
treatment of the interest element, which is the key here. This
example more closely resembles the example of an installment sale
from an individual to a business because it allows a loan to be treated
on a cash-flow basis. The same concern is present, the shifting of
inframarginal returns to non-taxpayers. And here again, this
transaction is not a problem in a closed system.
Example: Arbitrage
A U.S. business enters into an arrangement with a shell
corporation located in an offshore tax haven. In the arrangement,
the shell borrows money from the business and promises to repay
a contingent amount in the future. The shell then uses the
money to purchase an asset from the business. In addition, the
business agrees to repurchase the asset around the same time the
32 Note that the property could be fungible property. There is some question of

whether the business could use T-bills as the property, or whether, because they
are financial instruments, the business would be denied a deduction. But the
business could use gold or some other fungible, tradable, financial equivalent. If
operating business property were used, the property could be leased back during
the term of the loan.
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loan is due for the same contingent purchase price. The
contingency will be set so that it is very likely to go up at a very
high rate.

The cash flows on the transaction wash out. The business can
neither gain nor lose and at all times is in an identical position to
doing nothing. The tax result for the business, however, is an
immediate inclusion from the sale of the asset and a very large
deduction when the asset is repurchased. The loan has no results
under the Flat Tax. If the repurchase is set at high enough price, the
business can simply manufacture deductions.
This example uses the ability to structure investment returns as
either financial or real to create an arbitrage. The arbitrage puts the
tax liability in a non-taxpaying entity and creates an offsetting
deduction to a taxable business. Anti-arbitrage rules might prevent
transactions as bald as this one, but either the rules will be overbroad or there will be some gaps.
The underlying problem behind all these examples is that there
is no principled distinction between financial and real flows. For
example, asset pricing models apply equally to financial and real
returns. Economically, the two are simply not different and can,
therefore, be intertwined in an indefinite number of ways. The
transactions considered here are extremely simple, and I have no
substantial economic incentive to find the really big holes. Taxpayers
will have strong incentives to find others, and one can imagine that
many more exist.
Switching to a closed system (i.e., using invoices and a
destination basis) much like the European systems, would
substantially reduce the problems. All of the problems illustrated
above, except the problems in the retail installment sale example,
would be eliminated under such a system. But this solution would
effectively abandon the Flat Tax for a more traditional VAT.
If the basics of the Flat Tax are to be maintained, one place to
start would be the various time value of money rules in current law.33
For example, the installment sale rules would reduce the problem
33 Note also that we cannot rely on capitalization of tax benefits into prices to

reduce the problems presented here, as many of the transactions involve no net
cash flows and can be done regardless of the price of the asset.
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with understatement of interest in the sale from an individual to a
business. New rules imposing maximum interest rates would reduce
the problem of installment sales from businesses to individuals.
Special rules for forward sales that allow deduction or require
inclusion only of the fair market value of the underlying asset would
help (treating the rest as a payment on a financial transaction).
Integration rules or other anti-arbitrage rules would be needed to
reduce the problems with creating loans through the sale and
repurchase of property. The scope of these rules is likely to be broad
and uncertain, and their application complex.
The Flat Tax, however, does offer some simplification in the
financial products world. In particular, the character of gains and
losses as ordinary or capital would no longer matter. In addition,
timing would matter much less in the Flat Tax so many of the
timing rules can be eliminated. Overall, the set of rules needed
would be on the same order of magnitude in terms of complexity as
the financial products rules under current law.
B. Losses and the Operation of the Business Tax in a Flat Tax World
This section considers two related subjects: (i) the treatment of
net losses in a given year; and (ii) the rules governing business
transactions such as formation, liquidations and mergers. These two
topics are covered together because the treatment of losses is central
to the design of the business level tax.
Hall and Rabushka propose not to allow refunds for losses (i.e.,
a cash payment from the government equal to losses in the
accounting period multiplied by the tax rate), contrary to the
uniform rule for VATs. While they do not clearly state their reasons,
the apparent reason is the lack of invoices, which means the system
is open.34 In an open system there is no necessary tension between a
deduction (producing refundable losses) to one party and an
inclusion at the same tax rate to another party. Without this tension,

34 They simply state that “whenever the government starts writing checks, clever

people will abuse the opportunity through fraud and legal maneuvers.” Hall and
Rabushka at 41. The lack of invoices is the primary reason why the opportunities
for clever people will exist.
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pricing problems and outright fraud become a significant concern.35
Instead of allowing refunds, Hall and Rabushka propose to allow
losses to be carried forward (but not back) indefinitely, increased
each year by the average daily yield on three-month Treasury bills
during the first year.36
The interest rate is set lower than the market rate. Although
Hall and Rabushka do not give the reason why, presumably, if the
interest rate were the market rate, a carryforward regime would
create no fewer problems than a refund regime as the two would
have the same present value. Thus, the low interest rate might be
intended as an intermediate solution between full refundability or its
equivalent and current law, which allows carryforwards without
interest.
A low rate of interest on loss carryforwards will change some of
the conclusions about the effects of the Flat Tax given in section
__above. To the extent the interest rate is lower than the cost of
capital, the Flat Tax overtaxes some consumption. The value of the
initial deduction for an investment that creates a loss will not be
sufficient to offset the gain on the future sale because the deduction
grows at a rate that is lower than the market rate. The greater the
difference between the cost of capital and the carryforward rate, the
higher the tax. The cost of capital will be higher for riskier projects
but the refund rate will stay the same. Therefore, the analysis
showing that a consumption tax does not tax the returns to risk
would not apply: risky investments would be taxed at a higher rate
than low risk investments. In essence the carryforward regime creates
a sliding scale tax rate: goods and services produced by entities with
high costs of capital are subject to a higher tax than goods and
services produced by entities with lower costs of capital.
35 The Japanese consumption tax, however, is open (domestically) and allows

refunds. One reason they can allow this is that their tax rate is only three percent
reducing the incentive for evasion. Another reason is that they retained their
income tax and there may often be tension between avoiding their consumption
tax and creating income tax liability.
36 Apparently, the interest rate is determined based only on first year interest rates
and does not thereafter adjust. It is not clear why it does not adjust, particularly as
the rate is a short term rate. As discussed in the text below, this creates
administrative problems.
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While the nonrefundability of losses has economic
consequences, the immediate implications for implementation are
straightforward. Businesses would have to keep records of loss
carryforwards, adjusting them by the interest rate and the
government would have to publish the appropriate interest rates.
Some complications could arise in the Hall and Rabushka proposal
because carryforwards arising in different years would use different
interest rates requiring complex calculations and stacking rules to
determine which carryforwards are used first. Presumably, a single
interest rate could be used instead. The main impact of
nonrefundability, however, is in the design of the business tax.
To illustrate the connection between the treatment of losses and
the business tax, consider the tax system if losses in a given year were
refundable. Transactions between businesses would create no net tax
as taxable receipts to one would produce deductible payments to the
other, and the refund from the deduction would exactly equal the tax
on the receipts. The treatment of transactions between businesses,
therefore, would be relatively unimportant so long as businesses treat
transactions the same. All transactions between businesses, therefore,
could be treated as taxable Avoidance of taxable treatment would
also have no net effect (as long as nothing left the business tax base,
say as a distribution to shareholders, without tax). Few business tax
rules would be needed. This is demonstrated by the European VATs
which refund losses and have almost no special rules governing
transactions between businesses.37
If losses are not refundable, transactions between businesses can
have tax effects. Suppose loses were not refundable and could not be
carried forward or back. That is, losses not used against receipts in
the year incurred would be forfeited. In this case, a contribution of
property by a business to a newly formed joint venture, if treated as a
taxable transaction, may produce net tax—there would be an
immediate tax to the contributor on the exchange and, if the joint
venture does not immediately produce revenues, no offsetting
37 Some European VATs zero rate the sale of ongoing businesses, creating the

equivalent of nonrecognition under a subtraction method tax or income tax. As
zero rating grants relief only from administrative requirements and not from any
tax liability that would otherwise be owed on the transaction, the zero rating rule
creates little controversy.
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deduction to the new venture. We would need nonrecognition rules
for such formations. Similarly, a sale from a profit making company
to a company with no net receipts (say a bankrupt company) would
generate net tax revenues. The profit making company would have
taxable receipts but the bankrupt company would get no deduction.
There would a strong incentive for profitable businesses to acquire
money losing business and rules might needed to prevent distortions
in the market for corporate control. The various nonrecognition
regimes and the anti-loss trafficking rules are central elements of the
current corporate tax regimes and will probably need to be
duplicated in the Flat Tax because of the treatment of losses. Losses
are the pivotal element in the design of the business tax.
The easiest place to begin exploring the business tax is with the
formation of a business. There are two polar cases: the formation of
a new company by an individual (or other nontaxpayer) and the
formation subsidiary by a business. Suppose in both cases the
contributor transfers property to the business in exchange for equity
in the business.
The sensible rule for the formation of a business by an
individual is to treat it as a taxable sale. Under current law, a
formation is generally tax free to both the business and the
individual. That is, neither the individual nor the business recognize
gain or loss on the contribution. Because individuals would
otherwise be taxed, they like this treatment and generally do not seek
to avoid it. In the Flat Tax, however, nonrecognition would deny a
deduction to the business with no offsetting benefit to the individual
because individuals are not taxed on the sale of property anyway.
That is, if the same transaction were structured as a sale, the business
would get a deduction without offsetting gain to the individual.
Nonrecognition, therefore, would be taxpayer adverse rather than
taxpayer friendly and give individuals a strong incentive to structure
contributions as sales. As such, it would require enforcement, such as
a prophylactic rule treating all sales between any substantial owner of
a business and the business as a tax-free contributions and rules
preventing third parties from facilitating such sales. A good case can
be made that the Flat Tax should instead simply treat all formations
by individuals as sales.
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Now consider the formation of a subsidiary (sub) by a parent
corporation (parent). If the formation is treated as a sale, parent
would have taxable receipts and sub would have deductible
payments. But, as noted above, if sub is a new business that will not
produce net receipts for a number of years, parent’s tax would not be
offset by sub’s deduction. Each year the loss is carried forward it
loses value because the carryforward interest rate is below the market
rate, making the rule particularly punishing for long-term speculative
or research ventures. A tax-free contribution regime is necessary for
the formation of businesses by other businesses.38
Coordinating the two regimes, taxable treatment for
contributions by individuals and nonrecognition treatment for
contributions by businesses might be complex. Rules will be needed
much like current law to determine which contributions are tax-free
and which are taxable.
The same problem might occur for distributions of property
from a business. Again, consider individuals and businesses
separately. If a business distributes property to an individual, the
distribution must be taxable to the business. The business deducted
the cost of the property when it was purchased. The distribution
must be taxed to recapture the initial deduction. If not, business
could purchase consumption goods, deducting the cost, and
distribute them tax free to the owners of the business. Liquidating
distributions would get the same treatment as operating
distributions.
Suppose a subsidiary distributes property or liquidates into a
parent business. If losses were refundable, the distribution would
38 One question would be whether there should be a control requirement. The

current law nonrecognition rule for partnership formations has no control
requirement while the analogue for corporate formations requires the contributors
to control the new venture. The best (and only?) argument for a control
requirement would be that it limits loss trafficking: Without a control
requirement, businesses could contribute property to a loss corporation to soak up
the losses. While current law partnership rules do not require control on
formation, the partnership rules do have some rules to prevent transfers of losses or
gains to new partners. Nevertheless, given that the problem with losses under the
Flat Tax will be less than under current law and that the control requirement is not
a serious attempts to limit the problem, a control requirement would probably not
be optimal. See the discussion in the text on loss trafficking.
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never produce overall gain or loss because any gain to the subsidiary
would be offset by deductions to the parent. But if losses are not
refundable, we must count on the parent being able to use the
deduction (for the acquisition of sub’s property) or the distribution
will have a net tax effect. It would, therefore, be desirable to have a
nonrecognition rule somewhat like rule under current law for
distributions to and liquidations into parent businesses.
The rules governing corporate acquisitions raise similar issues.
Because the Flat Tax is R-based, the purchase of the stock of one
business by another is tax-free. But, without a special rule, the
purchase of assets of a business would be taxable.39 The question is
whether we should ever treat a stock purchase as a taxable asset
purchase or a taxable asset purchase as a tax-free stock purchase.
Once again, if losses were refundable, the two treatments would be
the same, except for administrative costs. European countries, for
this reason, generally “zero rate” (tax but at a tax rate of zero) the
purchase of an ongoing line of business, effectively allowing an asset
purchase of a line of business to get nonrecognition treatment. If
losses are not refundable, the treatment of a transaction as a tax-free
stock purchase or a taxable asset purchase can make a difference.
Buyers with losses would be unusable deductions in an asset
purchase and sellers with losses would have exempt gain on a stock
sale.
Current law attempts to minimize the differences between stock
and asset purchases, for example, through an election to treat a stock
purchase as an asset purchase. Eliminating the distinction between
two virtually identical transactions seems desirable. Moreover, if the
Flat Tax has a nonrecognition rule for formations, similar rules for
mergers or other acquisitions are necessary as many mergers can be
structured as formations. That is, it would be anomalous to have a
nonrecognition rule for formations but not mergers.
Subject to a loss trafficking rule (discussed below), the Flat Tax
can have relatively loose merger rules as compared to current law
because, unlike current law, nonrecognition treatment will is often
39 Note that there would be no need for a corollary to section 1060 in the Flat Tax

as allocation of purchase price to assets would make no difference. If Congress
were to enact special rules for particular assets, say to encourage or discourage
some type of activity, a corollary to section 1060 might then be needed.
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be the same as taxable treatment. For example, the Flat Tax could
mimic the European rules and simply have a line of business type
rule, so that any acquisition of a line of business is non-taxable.
Similarly, the Flat Tax could have a rule similar to current law
section 338 that would allow the acquisition of the stock of a
business to be treated as the acquisition of the assets of the business.
In both the asset and stock acquisition cases, we may be more
concerned about consistent reporting between the parties than the
substantive rules, so a completely elective regime (that requires joint
elections by the parties) might also be attractive.40
The general pattern from these examples is that transactions
between businesses can and often should be treated as
nonrecognition transactions, primarily to prevent the
nonrefundability of losses from distorting the results. At the same
time, transactions between businesses and individuals (and other
nontaxpayers) should be taxable.
The limitation on this logic is the concern about loss trafficking.
Nonrecognition rules in the Flat Tax would allow businesses to
transfer assets to loss companies to use up losses. For example, a
profit making company could purchase a readily marketable good,
claim a deduction for the purchase, and transfer it to a loss company
in exchange for (preferred) stock in a nonrecognition transaction.
The loss company would sell the good and use the losses to offset
the tax on the receipts. The net result is to transfer the loss to the
profit making company.
Transferability of losses may be a good thing, but it is not the
regime that Hall and Rabushka proposed. There is a significant
40 Spin-offs would be very simple. The distribution of stock would be

automatically tax-free as the Flat Tax is R-based, making all spin-offs tax free.
One interesting question is how much the design should be based on
expensing, that is, on the exact offset of the taxable receipts to the seller and
deductible payments by the buyer. As future Congress’s could easily amend the
expensing rules in the Flat Tax, the design of the system should be sufficiently
robust to work in a depreciation regime. If the Flat Tax had depreciation rules,
nonrecognition would matter even in the absence of losses. (Once the tax law uses
depreciation, timing matters and nonrecognition offers deferral.) Arguably, little
would change because, given the tax-free sale of stock for cash, it would be
difficult to require the sale of assets to be treated differently. Indeed, elective
nonrecognition regimes have long been proposed for the current corporate tax.
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tension between the need for nonrecognition rules and the rule that
losses are not freely transferable. The question is, assuming
transferability will not be literally allowed, whether or to what extent
rules should be adopted to limit loss transferring transactions
(including rules governing the purchase of loss company such as
current law section 382).
One possibility is limitations on nonrecognition similar to those
found under current law. For example, current law does not allow
transfers to corporations to be tax free unless the transferors have at
least 80 percent control of the corporation. Similarly, liquidations are
tax-free only into 80 percent corporate parents. Similar limitations
on loss transferability might need to be written into the
nonrecognition rules.
Current law also has explicit rules that limit the ability of
businesses to acquire other businesses to take advantage of unused
losses.41 The goal of these rules is to prevent the treatment of losses
from causing distortions in the market for corporate control caused
by the loss regime. These rules are very complex under current law
and similar rules would be equally complex under the Flat Tax.
There is no clear way to differentiate the bad transactions from the
good so that the rules are inaccurate, over-taxing some transactions
yet missing others that should be covered. Given that increasing
losses each year by the interest rate will mean the need to transfer
losses will be less than under current law, the scope of explicit antiloss trafficking regimes should be limited.42
The one area where the business tax would be simpler than
current law is in the treatment of distributions. The current rules for
both partnership and corporate distributions are complex—the
41 These rules can be found in current law section 382 and a variety of other

provisions. See, e.g., the consolidated return separate return limitation year rules.
42 If the financial products rules do not adequately deal with the straddle

transactions discussed above, taxpayers will be easily able to transfer losses to
eliminate business taxes. Suppose an individual owns a thriving business. The
individual would like to avoid having the business pay tax. To eliminate tax, the
individual enters into a straddle and transfers the losing position to the business in
a nonrecognition transaction. When the business takes delivery on the loss
property and promptly sells it, using the net loss to offset its operating income.
The individual pays no tax on the gain. If the straddle rules do not prevent this
transaction, loss importation rules might be needed.
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partners rules are designed to prevent disguised sales; the corporate
rules enforce the double level tax. In the Flat Tax, distributions
would simply be tax free and few rules would be needed.
The overall assessment of the business tax rules is that they
would be somewhat simpler than current law although many of the
basic elements of current law, such as nonrecognition rules and
distribution rules, would remain in the Flat Tax.43
C. Accounting Methods and Periods
This section considers two separate but related questions: (i)
what is the appropriate method of determining when transactions
are to be accounted for in the Flat Tax (the accounting method); and
(ii) what is the appropriate period for cumulating transactions (the
accounting period).
An initial intuition might be that the accounting method and
period do not matter in the Flat Tax because, as demonstrated in
Section I above, timing does not matter in the Flat Tax. The savings
from the initial deduction for an investment exactly pays for the tax
on the sale of the investment. If the sale is accelerated or deferred,
43 Current law also allows certain groups of controlled corporations to consolidate

their taxes, which effectively allows a single filing and allows losses of one member
of a consolidated group to be used against gains from another member.
Consolidation, effectively, allows businesses to put subsidiary operations in
separate entities for non-tax reasons but to be treated as a single entity for tax
purposes. Prohibition of consolidation would force businesses to operate in less
efficient form as branches rather than separate corporate entities.
Consolidation has the same benefits in the Flat Tax: use of losses is
important, so consolidation may be necessary to prevent inefficient internal
structures. Given that losses increase each year with interest, the need for
consolidation might be less than under current law, but nevertheless, it would still
be worthwhile. In addition, if most of the contribution and distribution problems
discussed above arise in closely held groups of businesses, consolidation may
eliminate many of the problems without the need for special nonrecognition rules.
The particularly scope of the consolidation rules could be based on current law or
loosened somewhat. The various complicated rules for consolidated entities under
current law would largely not be needed under the Flat Tax. For example, the
stock basis adjustment rules would not be needed as all stock transactions would be
tax free.
Hall and Rabushka would allow completely elective consolidation but imply
that it is only available for “subsidiaries.” Rules similar to those of current law
defining controlled groups would probably be necessary.
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the value of the tax savings from the initial deduction decreases or
increases accordingly because both the investment and the tax
savings grow at the same rate. Accelerating or deferring a
transaction, therefore, would have not benefit. Accounting methods
and periods (by definition) are solely to determine the timing of
transactions, and if timing does not matter, accounting methods and
periods should not matter. In fact, one scholar has argued that the
fact that timing does not matter in a consumption tax (so that the
timing of realization is not an issue) is one of the principal
administrative arguments in favor of such a tax over an income tax.44
The examples demonstrating that timing does not matter were
correct within their assumptions. The examples, however, assumed
that the accounting period is the same as or shorter than the
duration of a transaction. If a business purchased an asset in one year
and sold it ten years later, the equivalence between yield exemption
and cash-flow taxation is demonstrated with ten year or shorter
accounting periods. Suppose, instead, that the accounting period is
longer than the length of the transaction.
Example
An individual or foreigner sells an asset to a business for
$100 on December 31, 1999 and repurchases the asset for
$100.01 on January 1, 2000.
The individual or foreigner has no tax because under the Flat
Tax they are exempt. The business deducts $100 in 1999 and
includes $100.01 in 2000. If returns are filed on an annual basis, the
deduction would come a full year before the inclusion. For the cost
of the tax on one penny the business gets the use of the value of the
$100 deduction for one year.45 If, however, the property were
repurchased at the end of the year 2000, so that the accounting
period matched the length of the transaction, there would be no net
benefit or tax on the transaction. Another version of this transaction
44 See William D. Andrews, “The Achilles’ Heel of the Comprehensive Income

Tax,” in New Directions in Federal tax Policy for the 1980’s (Charles Walker and
Mark Bloomfield, eds. 1983).
45 This has been pointed out previously by Michael Calegari, Flat Taxes and
Effective Tax Planning, 51 National Tax J. 689 (1998).
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is simply to accelerate the purchase of property from nontaxpayers or
deferring the sale to nontaxpayers. Moving a purchase up by a few
days to an earlier year accelerates the deduction at a very low cost.
Deferring a sale by a few days can delay tax on the receipts for a year.
Timing can matter in the Flat Tax and, therefore, we must
determine the appropriate accounting period and method.
The obvious solution to this problem is to have short accounting
periods. If the accounting period were a single day (or a single
minute), there were be no distortions. One day’s (or one minute’s)
delay or acceleration of a transaction will produce one day’s (or one
minute’s) change in the timing of the tax deduction or inclusion.
Timing would no longer matter.
The obvious problem with daily accounting periods is
complexity. While a very short accounting period would not
necessarily require a filing for each period, it would require taxpayers
to track exactly when each transaction took place and make
adjustments, such as an interest charge, to reflect the timing of the
transaction. This would be impractical.
Most VATs require quarterly filings, and some allow monthly
filings (mostly to allow businesses to get refunds more quickly).46
Quarterly filing reduces the effect of timing disparities without
imposing enormous administrative costs. Some similar approach
might be necessary under the Flat Tax. Quarterly filing need only be
required of businesses as the accounting period problem is a problem
with the cash-flow mechanism, not the yield exempt mechanism.
Current law already requires businesses to make quarterly payments,
so quarterly filing would not be a big increase in filing costs.47
The shorter the accounting period, the lower the benefits to
manipulating the timing of transactions (and the lower the
inadvertent penalties for those on the wrong side). The question is
46 See Sweet & Maxwell, Ernst & Young VAT in Europe (1989) for a summary

of the European VAT rules.
47 Note that similar problems might occur if businesses are free to choose their tax

years. Then a sale from one business to another will not produce offsetting income
and deduction as the timing of their tax payments will vary. The question is
whether this effect, which can go either way, either a present value tax receipt or
present value tax loss, is large enough to distort transactions and to require that all
businesses have identical tax years, particularly given that requiring shorter
accounting periods reduces the problem
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whether quarterly accounting periods are sufficiently short that we
need not worry about the accounting method. The answer depends
on the cost of imposing accounting method rules that reduce
problems with the timing of transactions. (Note that eliminating the
problems through an accounting method is not possible because
taxpayers will have incentives to actually change the timing of
transactions, not just to manipulate the accounting rules.)
Hall and Rabushka propose to put all businesses on the cash
method of accounting. The idea seems to be that the cash method
measures actual inflows and outflows, so it is uniquely appropriate
for a cash-flow tax such as the Flat Tax. The cash method, however,
would be extremely easy to manipulate. For example, if a receipt is
delayed from the end of one quarter until the beginning of the next,
the loss of the use of money for a short time may be less than the
benefit of paying taxes a quarter later. Similarly, accelerating a
payment from one quarter to an earlier quarter may cause the
taxpayer to lose the use of money for a short time but may be offset
by the acceleration of the deduction.
Current law requires the accrual method of accounting in part
because it is thought to be less manipulable than the cash method.
Many elements of the accrual method, however, would have to be
rethought for the Flat Tax. The reason is that the accrual method is
designed to tax the return to investments.48 For example, the accrual
method requires current inclusion of unpaid interest on a debt
instrument. This would be inappropriate in the Flat Tax (leaving
aside that interest is not taxed) because the owner of the debt still
holds the investment. Any current inclusion would have to be offset
by an immediate deduction representing the continuing investment.
Only when the investment is sold should the owner be taxed.
All other rules in the accrual method would similarly have to be
evaluated. To illustrate the complexity of the task, consider the rules
for future payments that are fixed currently. These payments are
subject to the “economic performance rules” of current law.49 The
economic performance rules are designed to tax the return to
48 For a general discussion of how timing rules tax the return to savings, see

Daniel Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the “Time Value of Money,” 95
Yale L. J. 506 (1986).
49 See section 461(h).
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investments, so one might think initially that they are inappropriate
for the Flat Tax. It turns out, however, because of the way they are
structured, they work in the Flat Tax.
Suppose a defendant promises to pay a plaintiff in the future.
Under the economic performance rules, the deduction to the
defendant is deferred until payment. A cash method plaintiff is not
taxed until payment is received. Because the plaintiff is not taxed
until cash is received, the plaintiff is effectively exempt (under the
usual cash flow mechanism logic) The defendant, who holds and
invests the damages, however, is effectively taxed on the return to the
invested damages. The return to the investment is taxed under the
economic performance rules, but it is taxed to the defendant rather
than the plaintiff even though the plaintiff has the legal right to the
money
Under the Flat Tax, this system will continue to work
notwithstanding the intent of the rules to tax the return to
investments. The reason is that the defendant who holds and invests
the money will not be taxed on the return. The economic
performance rules would yield the correct result, zero tax on
marginal investments, under the Flat Tax. Other rules for deferred
payments, such as the nuclear decommissioning rules, qualified
settlement funds, or mine reclamation, however, use a different
mechanism to solve the same problem and may not work in the Flat
Tax.
Another common problem is distinguishing between loans,
prepayments, deposits, and receipts. The Flat Tax has a sharp
distinction between financial and other types of payments, so these
rules would be critical. For example, the Flat Tax will have to
determine when a power company that holds deposits from users
must include the deposits.50 In many cases, determining when such a
deposit has changed ownership from the utility user to the utility, is
difficult. The accrual method, therefore, might be appropriate but
each accrual rule would have to be reconsidered to reflect the goal of
no tax on the return to investments rather than a tax on the return.
An alternative would be rules similar to those used by European
VATs. VATs have detailed timing rules, often with different rules
50 See Commissioner v. Indianapolis Power & Light. Co., 493 U.S. 203 (1990).
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for the supply of goods and for services.51 Generally, however, they
treat the supply of the good or service as the taxable event. One
reason for looking to the supply of goods or services might be that
supply is less manipulable than the payment of cash. The problem
with adopting these rules is that they would be largely unfamiliar to
domestic businesses.52
Given that accounting rules will matter and that there is likely
to be more than one acceptable method of accounting, the Flat Tax
will probably need a counterpart to the rules in the current law that
prevent double counting when taxpayers change methods.53 These
are among the more complex set of accounting rules under current
law—they must define a method of accounting, permissible
methods, and rules for changing methods.
While the Flat Tax will need some accounting rules, the
problems with accounting methods should not be overstated. The
single biggest area of simplification in the Flat Tax is probably
accounting issues. The Flat Tax will eliminate many of the most
troublesome aspects of accounting under current law. The
capitalization requirement as embodied in common law principles54
and in complex statutory rules55 would be eliminated, substantially
simplifying accounting problems. Inventory rules56 would no longer
be necessary as inventory would be deducted when purchased. In
51 See Sweet and Maxwell, VAT in Europe (1989), for a description of the timing

rules in the various European VATs.
52 Moreover, the European rules would create some problems under the Flat Tax

and might require some modifications. For example, if the supply of goods or
services is the taxable event, prepayments cause problems. Unless interest is
imputed on the prepayment, so that the taxable amount is the fair market value of
the goods at the time they are taxed, too little income will be included. Including
prepayments on the cash method would work better. Consider a business that
receives an up-front payment to provide services in the future. If the payment is
taxable and the cost of providing the services is deductible, the usual pattern of an
initial deduction for costs followed by a receipt for sales is reversed. Nevertheless,
an up-front tax followed by future deductions should still lead to a present value
zero tax.
53 See sections 446(e) and 481.
54 See INDOPCO v. Commissioner, 503 U.S.79 (1992).
55 See the uniform capitalization rules of section 263A.
56 See section 471.
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addition, timing problems are limited by the length of the
accounting period while there is no similar limit under the income
tax. For example, special rules for long term contracts,57 which are
extremely complex and important under the income tax, would have
far less importance under the Flat Tax because taxpayers could only
achieve deferral of the length of one accounting period.
The net result for accounting methods and periods is that the
rules would be substantially simpler than current law. But accounting
methods and periods would still matter. Moreover, the many of the
accounting method rules would probably have to be different than
those of current law.
D. International Transactions
This section considers design issues relating to international
transactions. While adequate taxation of international transactions is
critical to any tax reform plan, the conclusion of this section is that
the Flat Tax, from a design perspective, offers few new, difficult
problems and substantially simplifies current law. Note, however,
that the problems created by having an open system, which
significantly includes being open internationally, are not generally
treated here as separate international tax problems although they
could be because the relevant transactions are across international
borders. Thus, a problem with a cross-border financial transaction is
treated here as a problem with the taxation of financial products.
Recall that the Flat Tax will be origin-based, so that businesses
deduct the cost of imports and are taxed on exports. The basic rules
for an origin-based system are straightforward. They are the same as
for domestic transactions: taxpayers get a deduction for purchases
and inclusion for sales. If goods or services are transported across
borders without a sale, (e.g., a transfer to a foreign branch of a
domestic business), the good is treated as sold at the border for its
fair market value, and, similarly a good imported into the U.S.
without a sale is treated as purchased at the border for its fair market
value. A number of other issues arise in the international setting
which are discussed below.

57 See section 460.
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1. Transfer Pricing
Because goods must be valued when they cross the border,
valuation and, in particular, transfer pricing (i.e., pricing of goods
transferred between controlled entities), is a problem. For example,
consider a taxpayer who begins the manufacture of a car in the
United States, ships it to Mexico for some stage of production and
then ships it back to the United States to be finished and sold. If the
transfer price when the car is shipped to Mexico is low and the price
when the car returns is high, the taxpayer can shift income to
Mexico from the United States. Similarly, a service provider might
sell services from an offshore tax haven while providing all the work
domestically. Only to the extent value is added in the tax haven, are
the receipts properly allocable to the tax haven, but enforcing
appropriate transfer pricing will be difficult.
It is likely that the regime would have similar scope and
complexity to that of current law. Because the Flat Tax is territorial
while current law has world-wide jurisdiction, locating earnings
offshore may create more of an advantage under the Flat Tax than
under current law, but the extent of the difference is not clear, given
the ability to defer the taxation of foreign earnings under current
law. At most, more enforcement or a slightly stronger set of
regulations might be needed. The details of transfer pricing
enforcement, however, are not as important as noting that the need
for transfer pricing enforcement is a very significant fact in
evaluating the simplicity of the Flat Tax.
2. Creditability of the Flat Tax
If a foreign country has an income tax that taxes worldwide
income, generally only other income taxes are creditable against the
foreign income tax. This is the case, for example, for the U.S.
worldwide income tax with respect to foreign taxes. The issue is
whether the Flat Tax would be creditable for foreign tax purposes.
Reuven Avi-Yonah suggests that this might be a problem.58
I do not believe this issue is very serious. On the margin, the
Flat Tax imposes no tax on capital income, so, on a present value
basis, credits do not matter. Effectively, if the Flat Tax is not
58 Reuven Avi-Yonah, The International Implications of Tax-Reform, Tax Notes

913 (November 13, 1995)
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creditable against foreign income taxes, the initial reduction in
credits when the investment is expensed exactly offsets the value of
the credits from the U.S. tax on the future returns form the
investment.
As noted above, an origin-based tax taxes inframarginal returns
on inbound investments, so whether the tax is creditable matters
only here. But if the inframarginal investment is specific to the
United States, whether the foreign country grants a credit will not
affect the decision where to invest. Whether to grant the credit will
be up to the foreign country and while it may matter to individual
businesses, it need not concern us as a serious issue in implementing
the Flat Tax. The only case remaining, where the inframarginal
return is not specific to the United States, is unlikely to be large
category.
3. Treaties
Avi-Yonah, in the same article, as well as elsewhere, has
suggested that the Flat Tax would not qualify under existing treaties,
requiring renegotiation of our entire treaty network. Moreover, as
the Flat Tax eliminates the withholding tax on dividends and the
withholding tax is one of the main negotiating tools in the treaty
process, renegotiation may not be possible. The Flat Tax would,
then, effectively, toss out the entire network of tax treaties of the
United States. And treaties are important to U.S. businesses as they
provide reductions or exemptions from foreign withholding taxes,
they scale back the tax reach of host countries, and they prevent
discriminatory treatment of foreign investment by host countries.
Renegotiation of treaties would be a major implementation cost of
the Flat Tax.
Tax treaties apply to income taxes. Avi-Yonah notes that the
Flat Tax is not an income tax and, concludes that, therefore, it does
not qualify as under existing treaties. Nevertheless, as a matter of
treaty interpretation, existing treaties should apply to the Flat Tax.
Treaties typically apply to “federal income taxes” and any identical or
substantially similar taxes.59 Generally, income taxes are not defined
in treaties. While the Flat Tax would tax consumption, not income,
it is not labeled a consumption tax, which seems to be the key factor.
59 See, e.g., Model Treaty Article 2.2
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For example, the United States has previously had periods under its
so-called income tax where, because of accelerated depreciation and
investment tax credits, the tax on capital was zero or negative,
effectively creating a consumption tax. Abrogation of treaties because
we adopted accelerated depreciation and an investment tax credit
was not an issue. There is no reason to believe that treaties would be
less applicable to the Flat Tax than to the income tax in periods
when the tax on capital was zero.60
If the Flat Tax qualifies as an income tax under the treaties, the
only issue is whether other countries would abrogate their treaties in
response to some perceived or real threat from the Flat Tax. It is
difficult to determine the response of other nations. There are
arguments on both sides and commentators have differed in their
speculations. All I can offer here is that if other nations abrogate
their treaties, renegotiation would be difficult as there would have to
have been some reason for abrogation. The Flat Tax eliminates
withholding taxes on foreign investments in the United States.
Withholding is the most important leverage we have to induce other
nations to sign treaties. To help with renegotiation, consideration
should be given to retaining the withholding tax.
4. U.S. as Tax Haven
The decision by other nations to abrogate treaties may depend
on whether U.S. would become a tax haven under the Flat Tax
because of its low tax on capital. If the U.S. were a significant tax
haven, given the size of the economy and richness of investment
60 The Flat Tax would most likely qualify as an income tax under Treas. Reg.

§1.902-2. It is hard to imagine that depreciation rather than expensing is the
necessary qualification of an income tax. And clearly, economic depreciation is not
required as our current tax system allows depreciation faster than economic
depreciation, which would mean some level of depreciation faster than economic
but slower than expensing is required.
Avi-Yonah also argues that the denial of the interest deduction would mean
that the Flat Tax is not an income tax. (See p. 922). This makes no sense.
Substitute taxation is not inconsistent with income taxation. A purely business
level income tax, such as CBIT would not be an income tax under this theory.
Finally, it is hard to imagine that the Flat Tax would both be treated as a
direct tax under the GATT, forcing us into an origin-basis system and fail to be
treated as an income tax under the treaties. While the terms direct tax and income
tax are not correlated in theory, in their application one can imagine some linking.
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opportunities, capital would flow to the U.S. and away from more
productive uses, particularly in developing countries, which could
create serious consequences. Other countries would be forced to
abandon their taxes on capital, forcing the world into less progressive
taxation and limiting other country’s choices for financing their
governments.61 Avi-Yonah, consistent with his prediction on treaties
predicts that the U.S. would become a tax haven.
I think this prediction is simply incorrect. The United States
previously has had a very low, even negative, tax on capital income
and problems with foreign investors sheltering income in the United
States were not sufficient to cause serious international concerns.
And under the prior low capital tax regimes, interest was deductible
to the payer while under the Flat Tax, interest would not be
deductible, making it much more difficult for a foreigner to
repatriate gains without tax. Moreover, to the extent capital is
located in the U.S., there will be an additional demand for dollars, so
currency adjustments should quickly eliminate any benefits from
investing in the U.S.
5. Simplification
The simplification potential of the Flat Tax with respect to
international tax rules is significant. For example, the foreign tax
credit rules62 and the anti-deferral rules,63 both of which are a
significant element of foreign tax planning and complexity, could be
eliminated. Moreover, the source rules64 could be substantially
simplified as we would not need separate baskets or expense
allocation rules. The rules for cross-border nonrecognition
exchanges65 could be eliminated as any movement of an asset across
61 This point can be stated more carefully. Suppose taxing capital were efficient,

fair, or otherwise desirable and suppose that capital is highly mobile. If each
country acts on its own, each country has an incentive to have a lower tax rate on
capital than other countries to attract capital, leading to an undesirably low tax on
capital. Only through cooperation can the appropriate tax on capital be achieved.
The U.S., by adopting a zero tax on capital, would be failing to cooperate.
62 See sections 901-908.
63 See, e.g., sections 951-964 (Subpart F), and 1291-1298 (the passive foreign
investment company rules).
64 See sections 861-865.
65 See section 367.
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the border would be taxable and movements of stock across the
border would be irrelevant to the tax base.
6. Summary of International Issues
Despite the complexity of the economic issues, the design
considerations for international taxation under the Flat Tax are
mostly good news. The Flat Tax would allow substantial
simplification of the international tax rules. The most important
downside (at least with respect to design) of adopting an originbased tax, like the Flat Tax, is that it requires transfer pricing.
E. Small Businesses
This section considers the treatment of small businesses. Hall
and Rabushka have no definition of a business (other than the
useless statement that each sole proprietorship, partnership, and
corporation constitutes a business), and no explicit exception for
small businesses. Discussion in their book indicates that the
definition of a business is intended to be broad.66 There is no small
business exception under current law—small businesses, while
subject to many simplifying rules, must file returns and pay taxes like
any other business. Nevertheless, despite the lack of small business
exceptions in the Hall and Rabushka outline and in current law,
there are good reasons for having a small business exemption in the
Flat Tax.
To motivate the problem, consider an example given by Alan
Feld.67 A taxpayer owns a home and uses it as a personal residence.
This is a durable, nonproductive asset currently used jointly for
consumption and investment. It would under the Flat Tax be taxed
under the yield-exemption method and avoid the transition tax and
66 For example, their 1985 book, The Flat Tax, has a sample business return in

which the business has gross receipts of about $47,000. In their 1983 book, they
refer to a landlord (of an apartment building) as a taxable business.
Note that there is a relatively easy definitional issue lurking underneath the
discussion of small businesses. The Flat Tax needs to ensure that irregular profit
making activity, such as the sale of a home or of used property is not treated as a
business. VATs generally solve this problem by requiring regular and consistent
activity and explicitly exclude occasional sales. The Flat Tax will need a similar
definition regardless of any small business exception.
67 Alan Feld, Living with the Flat Tax, __ National Tax J. 603 (199_).
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the tax on any inframarginal return. Suppose the taxpayer decides to
rent out a room for a six month period while continuing to live in
the rest of the house.
If the rental were treated as a business, we would, as noted
above in Section __ above, treat the formation of the rental business
as the purchase of an asset by a new business, the rental business,
which would get a deduction for the fair market value of the room.
The business would include the rents, and, at the end of the six
month period, be treated as selling the room back to the original
owner. This system is complex and, most importantly, requires
valuation. The homeowner would have to value the room on the date
of the formation of the business and on the date of the liquidation of
the business.
The valuation requirements probably make this treatment
infeasible for many and subject to significant abuse by the aggressive.
An initial reaction, therefore, is that the example illustrates an
intolerable situation. The task is to consider the costs and benefits
more explicitly.68 There are (at least) four reasons for having a small
business exception and several countervailing factors.
68 VATs around the world almost uniformly have some small business exception,

but they vary greatly in size. In Europe, thresholds range from the equivalent of
$61,000 gross receipts in the United Kingdom to a little over $1,000 in Norway
and Denmark. The EC recommends an exemption level of about $6,700. The
Japanese VAT, which is open, has a large exemption, covering businesses with
gross receipts of less than about $300,000. Our federal income tax, however, has
no small business exception – businesses of any size must file returns.
There is a limit, however, to how much we can learn from these other
systems. As noted in the text in Section __, if the tax is closed, the effect of
exemption is different than if the tax is open. A small business exception in a open
tax exempts the product of small businesses no matter where they are in the chain
of production. A small business exception in a closed tax only exempts their
product if they are at the retail level and has the potential to double tax small
businesses operating at prior stages of production. For these reasons, small
businesses frequently elect to be taxable in closed VATs. In addition, because the
tax is closed valuation is not an issue on business formations as no credit would be
allowed for the acquisition of assets from a non-taxpayer.
The Japanese consumption tax is closer to the Flat Tax because it is open,
and it exempts a large number of businesses. My current understanding is that the
Japanese system does not allow businesses credits for the acquisition of assets when
they cross the threshold. I do not understand why this does not create substantial
distortions for business formations. One possibility is that Japan retained its
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First, as indicated in the rental example, taxing all small
businesses would impose significant valuation problems. Assets
would be over-valued on contribution, creating large deductions, and
under-valued on distribution, creating small inclusions. The
government would find it difficult to challenge these valuations
given both the large number of transactions at issue and the
difficulty of challenging any individual transaction.
Second, allocation of costs between personal consumption and
the business would be difficult if small businesses are taxed. In the
Feld example, cutting the lawn will be partially a business activity
and partially consumption, and the costs would have to be allocated
between the two, as would furnace repairs, shoveling snow, and
paying property taxes. There are strong incentives to allocate
consumption costs to businesses as doing so generates a tax
deduction.
This problem exists under the current income tax but it would
probably be worse under the Flat Tax. The reason is that there is a
sharper distinction under the Flat Tax between businesses and
individuals than under current law. The Flat Tax eliminates all
business related deductions by individuals, such as deductions for
unreimbursed employee expenses. But the same expenses incurred by
an independent contractor taxed as a business would be deductible.
There will, therefore, be a stronger incentive under the Flat Tax to
be classified as an independent contractor. A small business
exception would reduce the problem as there would be no advantage
to allocating costs to an exempt business.
Third, the administrative costs of taxing small businesses are
substantially higher than for other businesses. For example, a New
Zealand study reported that on average, a firm with under
income tax when the consumption tax was put in place, so structuring a formation
as a sale may reduce the VAT but would result in an income tax liability. This
might particularly be true because the Japanese consumption tax rate is only three
percent. If this is the explanation then the Japanese experience is also not that
helpful as the Flat Tax would repeal the income tax and be imposed at a
sufficiently high rate to give businesses incentives to avoid it
Another problem with looking to VATs for small business models is that
VATs tax wages at the business level while the Flat Tax does not. The effect of a
small business exception, even aside from whether the tax is open or closed, will be
different in the Flat Tax and a VAT.
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approximately $16,000 (U.S.) gross receipts spent 500 times as much
(as a percentage of sales) to comply with their VAT as businesses
with over $26 million in receipts.69 The United States General
Accounting Office reports that the governments administrative costs
can be substantially reduced by exempting small businesses.70
Fourth, the reduction in tax revenues from a small business
exception may be low because the vast majority of business assets are
held by larger businesses. For example, the GAO reports in the same
study that in the United States, when sole proprietors and farmers
are included as businesses, 0.4 percent of the business income tax
returns account for 70 percent of the income tax revenue. DanforthBoren justified their $100,000 exemption for their proposed
subtraction method VAT by noting that only _% of assets were held
by businesses with gross-receipts less than that amount. Similarly,
the Japanese small business exception, while even larger than the
Danforth-Boren proposal, exempts only a small portion of business
receipts from tax.71 Moreover, the business tax in the Flat Tax
generally only taxes transition assets and inframarginal returns,
which should lower the costs even further. Finally, a small business
exception will reduce taxpayers’ ability to treat consumption
expenditures as business expenses, further lowering the revenue costs
of an exception.
These four considerations create a strong argument for a small
business exception. Note, however, that only the valuation problem
is unique to the Flat Tax as creation of a business under the current
income tax or under a credit-invoice VAT is usually a non-taxable
event. The administrative benefits and the benefit of simplifying the
allocation of personal and business items are both present in current
69 Cedric Sandford and John Hasseldine, The Compliance Costs of Business

Taxes in New Zealand, Victoria University of Wellington, Institute of Policy
Studies (Wellington, New Zealand, 1992).
70 U.S. Gen. Acct. Off., Tax Policy: Valued Added Tax: Administrative Costs
Vary with Complexity and Number of Businesses (1993).
71 The Japanese consumption tax exempts businesses with taxable sales of less that
$300,000 (during the prior two years). In 1992 the Japanese government estimated
that 60 percent of all businesses were exempt from tax yet sales by these businesses
accounted for only 2-3 percent of total domestic taxable sales. See Alan Schenk,
Japanese Consumption Tax After Six Years: A Unique VAT Matures, __ Tax
Notes 899, 904 (November 13, 1995).
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law (although there are some additional advantages to being
classified as independent contractors under the Flat Tax).
Nevertheless, these problems are sufficiently difficult that combined
with the valuation problem, some type of small business exception is
warranted.
There are some countervailing factors, however. If small
businesses were exempt, business owners would have incentives not
to pay wages above the personal allowance as any wages above the
personal allowance would be taxable. If, instead, the business paid
wages to the owner up to the personal allowance and paid all other
earnings as dividends, the business and owner together would pay no
taxes. While the Flat Tax could impose reasonable compensation
rules, a sizable small business exemption would realistically exempt a
good portion of wages of small business owners. Exempt small
businesses could also provide employees with tax-free fringe benefits
which would not be subject to a reasonable compensation claim.
To the extent a reasonable compensation rule cannot be
adequately enforced, a generous small business exception may make
the independent contractor, employee distinction worse rather than
better, as suggested above. Many employees would seek to become
independent contractors, exempt from tax as small businesses and
pay themselves below market wages. This could be policed through
the definition of independent contractor, but like policing a
reasonable compensation rule, doing so would be difficult.72
In addition, a small business exception might make valuation
problems worse. Without any small business exception (or a very
small one), taxpayers will be able to misvalue assets like the rented
room in the above example to reduce taxes. But an expansive
72 Credit-invoice VATs should have this same problem, however, and they almost

universally have small business exemptions, although they vary greatly in size.
Because the Flat Tax is open, however, a small business exception in the Flat Tax
would exempt more businesses than in credit invoice VATs. That is, in a credit
invoice VAT, exemption is a mixed blessing and many businesses elect to be
taxable. For retail businesses, exemption eliminates tax on the valued added at that
level. But for businesses selling prior to the retail level, exemption double taxes as
the business would not receive a credit for the purchase of its inputs and the
purchaser of its outputs would not receive a credit for the cost. In an open tax,
exemption would eliminate tax at both the retail and wholesale level, which may
greater expand the size of any exemption.
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exception for small businesses may exacerbate the valuation problem
rather than reduce it. For very small businesses, the range of possible
valuations will be relatively small. As the business gets larger, it may
more legitimately claim very large valuations of its assets, particularly
as the business develops intangible assets—think of a start-up
biotech company that can claim to have the cure for the common
cold, or even a one in a thousand chance of a cure. It will claim a
huge deduction up front and corresponding receipts will never be
taxed. Moreover, the business could eventually be sold to a profitmaking business that can use the losses generated by the huge up
front deduction.73
There does not seem to be any easy solution. Taxing all small
businesses would be unnecessarily complicated but an expansive
exception would create its own problems. The best answer I have
seen so far is to have a threshold somewhere near the personal
allowance amount, say receipts of $40,000, but allow businesses that
cross the threshold to deduct only their historic costs. Consider a
business that starts off very small with a few assets and in time grows
sufficiently large to cross the threshold. Had it been taxed under the
cash-flow mechanism all along, its deductions would have been
limited to its costs. In many small businesses, increase in value is due
to labor. If the business pays the employees a salary, the salary would
be an historic cost, so this increase in value would be deductible. If
the business does not pay appropriate salaries, no deduction would
be allowed for these costs, effectively recapturing the tax that should
have been paid on the salaries.
This solution is very rough. It reduces the administrative
benefits of a small business exception because it requires businesses
to keep records, regardless of their size, if they eventually want to
claim a deduction for the costs. Moreover, because historic costs
would only include salaries if they are actually paid, businesses would
have to pay salaries even if the payment is nondeductible to the
73 Another problem with a large small business exception is the need for

aggregation. If the small business exception is sufficiently large, it will become
worthwhile to structure businesses in separate entities to avoid crossing the size
threshold. Presumably, some sort of aggregation rule would be needed and any
such rule would be complex. The larger the exception, the greater the need for
aggregation as it will become useful to larger and larger businesses.
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business and not includible to the owner/employee because of the
personal allowance, further complicating the lives of small business
owners. And given the zero tax rate created by the personal
allowance, there is an incentive to increase costs artificially by paying
related parties salaries up to the personal allowance. Combine these
complexities with aggregation rules and one can imagine that there
would still be a market for tax advice for small businesses, even after
enactment of the Flat Tax.
More important, the historic cost limitation is only a rough
proxy for true costs. The deduction is deferred until the business
crosses the threshold even though the costs were incurred earlier,
reducing the value of the deduction by the time value of money. But
if the operation had been a taxable business all along, receipts would
have been taxed. Unless we require the business to record its receipts
and increase costs by the interest rate there is no easy way to adjust
for these problems. But imposing such a regime would impose a level
of complexity that would fully moot any small business exception.
Perhaps the best solution is to assume the two factors roughly offset
and allow a deduction only for actual historic costs.
Finally, an historic cost rule would create an anomaly whereby a
business that purchases an asset would get a deduction equal to the
fair market value of the asset (the purchase price) but a business that
merely grows sufficiently to cross the threshold would only get a
deduction for historic costs. We would effectively be treating the
owner of the business worse than an acquirer. One might reduce this
anomaly by allowing businesses a deduction for current value if it can
prove to some degree of confidence its actual value (for example, a
third party loan would be evidence of true value) but any such rule
would be complex.
The only obvious conclusion from the discussion is that there is
no simple way out. Having no small business exception would
impose large administrative costs, particularly when one considers
examples like Feld’s rental of a room. A large small business
exception creates other problems, particularly, the need to value
assets when the threshold is crossed or to keep records of historic
costs. A moderate sized exception with an historic cost limitation
may be the best we can do, but further searching for a solution is
needed.
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One final note on the definition of a business. Leasing presents
an important problem. If holding leased property is not a business,
there will be incentives for individuals to lease property to businesses
to avoid the transition tax and the tax on inframarginal returns. For
example, before the Flat Tax took effect, businesses with high basis
assets would sell the assets to individuals and lease them back.
Similarly, investments likely to produce inframarginal returns could
be formally owned by individuals and leased to businesses. One
solution is to treat leasing as a business regardless of size, although
this would make the Feld example into a businesses. Compromises
might include a lower limitation for leasing than for other small
businesses, different rules for real estate leasing, or more narrowly,
different rules for leases of residences.
F. The Distinction between Investment and Consumption.
The difference between investment and consumption is basic to
both the income tax and the consumption tax. In a cash-flow
consumption tax, investments are deducted while consumption is
not. In an income tax, investments receive basis or an immediate
deduction while consumption does not. But both taxes must
distinguish between investment and consumption, and there are few
reasons to believe it would be easier under the Flat Tax than under
current law.
One advantage of the Flat Tax is that it taxes individuals on a
yield-exempt basis, which means there is no difference between
investment and consumption for individuals, at least with respect to
yield-exempt assets. For example, whether a work of art is
investment or consumption would not matter. Whether the purchase
of a house is investment or consumption (or some of both) would
not matter. While this seems to offer some simplification, most of
the issues under an income tax would be the same under the Flat
Tax because most issues involve a business. Consider three typical
problems involving mixed consumption and business expenditures:
(i) fringe benefits, (ii) hobby losses, home offices and other problems
determining whether an expense is allocable to a business; and (iii)
personal expenses of producing income, such as the costs of
commuting or child care.
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1. Fringe Benefits
Fringe benefits raise difficult issues under current law because
they combine elements of business expense and personal
consumption. These problems will be the same under the Flat Tax.
Consider a employer that purchases a car and allows an
employee to use it without restriction. Under an income tax, if the
car is not taxed as a fringe benefit but is deducted by the employer,
the income (and the consumption created by the income) escapes
taxation. For example, if the company earns $100 profit selling
widgets and uses the profit to compensate the employee with a car,
some of the profits go untaxed. The business would have to pay an
immediate tax on the $100 but would get to depreciate the car, so
the difference between $100 and the present value of the
depreciation deductions gets taxed, but the remainder of the $100 of
earnings goes untaxed. Under a cash-flow tax the business would get
an immediate deduction for the car, meaning the entire $100 would
go untaxed. This distinction does not seem to make the Flat Tax
significantly worse than the current tax.
Hall and Rabushka would deny businesses deductions for fringe
benefits. This approach to fringe benefits is not limited to the Flat
Tax and similar approaches have been proposed for the income tax.74
That is, there is no reason to believe that the solution to fringe
benefit problems is any easier under the Flat Tax than under current
law.
Moreover, Hall and Rabushka’s simple statement of their
proposal for fringe benefits conceals the complex nature of the
problem. It would be very complicated to define fringe benefits. We
would have to determine which meals eaten on the job are fringe
benefits and which are not. When travel is a fringe benefit? Would a
fancy room at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel provided free to the
manager or meal vouchers for policemen be fringe benefits?75 What
74 See, for example, Daniel I. Halperin, Business Deductions for Personal Living

Expenses: A Uniform Approach to an Unsolved Problem, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 859
(1974); William A. Klein, The Deductibility of Transportation Expenses of a
Combination Business and Pleasure Trip—A Conceptual Analysis, 18 Stan. L.
Rev. 1099 (1966).
75 See Benaglia v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 838 (1937); Commissioner v.
Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77 (1977).
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about parking spaces, company provided gyms, and discounts at the
company store? What about a corner office with expensive art, fancy
furniture and a secretary to do your bidding? Current law has
struggled with all of these problems. Many non-cash benefits involve
mixed consumption and business motivations, and a rule denying a
deduction for fringe benefits does not reduce or change in any
significant way the problems with distinguishing the two elements.
While some fringe benefits, such as health care, are easy to identify,
the complexity of current law stems from difficult classification
problems, all of which would be present in the Flat Tax. Record
keeping and classification rules such as those found in section 274 of
current law would be necessary.
Denying the deduction would also, in many cases, over-tax the
benefits as many fringe benefits have some business element. The
appropriate treatment of a fringe benefit that has both compensatory
and productive elements is to tax the compensatory element but not
the productive element.76 For example, under current law, we only
deny 50% of the expense for meals and entertainment on the theory
that some element of these expenses is for business purposes. To the
extent that the Flat Tax would over-tax fringe benefits, it would
introduce inefficiencies in the opposite direction from those of
current law.
In any event, there is no reason to believe that fringe benefit
taxation would be any easier under the Flat Tax than under current
law. The incentives remain about the same and the complexity of the
issues and transactions would remain.
2. Claiming Business Deductions for Personal Expense
Claiming business deductions for personal expenses is a
common method of deducting consumption expenses under current
law. Absent a small business exception, the incentives would be the
same under the Flat Tax (and maybe even stronger as businesses can
fully expense all purchases.)
One of the most common examples is home offices. Under
current law, draconian rules are needed to prevent abuse of home
office deductions. Under the Flat Tax, no deduction is allowed for
76 See Avery Katz and Gregory Mankiw, How Should Fringe Benefits Be Taxed?,

38 National Tax J. 37 (198_).
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any business costs of employees so only those claiming to run their
own business from their home would be able to claim the home
office deduction. Removing employees from the home office
deduction would not help much. Independent contractors are the
guts of the problem and the problems would be identical under the
Flat Tax and the current income tax.
The only reason the Flat Tax might be simpler is if, as
suggested above, a small business exception is adopted. Then
individuals would be unable to claim a home office deduction until
the business exceeded the threshold. If the threshold is reasonably
large, many cases would disappear. This would still leave a category
of sole proprietors with reasonably sized businesses who could
illegitimately claim a home office deduction, but the category would
likely be smaller than current law. (Note also that adopting a closed
version of the Flat Tax would solve this problem as well.) Of course,
the income tax could very well solve the problem the same way by
exempting small businesses.
Along similar lines, individuals frequently attempt to deduct the
costs of a hobby as business expenses. For example, an individual
might invest money in a horse farm and deduct the expenses on
theory that the farm is a business. Once again, the problem is the
same under the income tax as under the Flat Tax and a small
business exception would reduce many of the problems.
3. Mixed Expenses
Individuals incur a variety of expenses that have both business
and consumption elements, such as the costs of commuting, work
clothing, and child care. These costs are associated with labor
income which makes accurately measuring labor income is difficult.
The Flat Tax proposal would deny all of these deductions
presumably because these costs reflect consumption choices. This
approach is similar to that of current law, although current law does
offer some exceptions, such as the non-taxation of employer
provided subsidies for public transportation or parking and the
child-care credit. The problems with properly measuring labor
income under the Flat Tax should be the same as under the current
income tax and there is no reason to expect that the implementation
would be or should be any different.
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4. Summary
The Flat Tax will need rules similar to current law to
distinguish consumption from business costs. A small business
exception would eliminate some problems, and some of the Hall and
Rabushka proposals would be an improvement to current law. To
the extent Flat Tax proposals simplify these rules, however, the
simplifications would work for current law. Design choices here are
readily accessible by looking to current law or the large number of
articles discussing changes. There is nothing special about the Flat
Tax that makes these problems easier or more difficult.
III. Additional Design Issues
This section will briefly consider ten additional design issues to
get a sense of the overall complexity and administrative costs. These
ten issues (and the six considered above) are only a sampling of the
issues that would have to be covered in a complete version of the Flat
Tax.
A. Independent Contractors
As mentioned several times above, the Flat Tax will have to
distinguish between independent contractors and employees. The
distinction is extremely problematic under current law. The IRS uses
a 20 factor test that is frequently at odds with taxpayers’ asserted
classifications and there are frequent significant disputes.
The distinction will have greater effects under the Flat Tax than
under current law. In some ways it will be more burdensome to be an
independent contractor and in some ways less so. In particular,
independent contractors, under the Flat Tax have to file business tax
returns calculated on the cash flow basis. Employees are taxed only
on wages. Under current law, many independent contractors need
not file separate business returns. The separate filing requirement
will be a surprise to many who believed they could use the postcard
return.
On the other hand, many will attempt to structure relationships
as independent contractor relationships, happy to file the extra
return for the tax benefits. For example, costs that are deductible to
independent contractors would not be deductible to an employee.
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And independent contractors can pay themselves below-market
wages, taking the remainder of their true wages as return on equity.
We can fully expect, therefore, significant controversy,
complexity, and litigation over this distinction. The level of
controversy and complexity should as great or greater than that of
current law.
B. Pensions and Deferred Compensation
The treatment of pensions under the Flat Tax has already been
subject to preliminary analysis.77 This section will briefly discuss
some of the conclusions.
Under the Flat Tax, investment income is generally exempt
from tax, either under the cash flow mechanism or the yield exempt
mechanism. Pension income in a qualified plan under current law is
subject to the cash flow mechanism. Employers deduct the
contribution to the pension like the payment of any other wages.
Employees have no immediate inclusion, which can be understood
as an immediate inclusion followed by a deduction for the pension
investment. When the employee withdraws the money, the
employee is taxed. Effectively, pensions are taxed under the cash
flow method. Therefore, the general treatment of investments under
the Flat Tax is the same as the treatment of pensions under current
law.
Current law, however, imposes a number of restrictions on cash
flow treatment. For example, current law imposes nondiscrimination
requirements, which prevent employers from offering pensions only
to highly compensated employees. In addition, current law has
withdrawal restrictions and funding requirements. All investments
under the Flat Tax receive this treatment, so as Michael Graetz and
Dan Halperin point out, there will be an incentive to avoid pensions
under the Flat Tax if they are subject to these requirements78.
Effectively, under the Flat Tax, the law could not impose any
77 See Tax Reform, Implications for Economic Security and Employee Benefits,

Employee Benefits Research Institute (Dallas Salisbury, ed 1997).
78 See Michael Graetz and Daniel Halperin, Comprehensive tax Reform and

Employee Benefits: The Case of Employment-Based Pensions and Health
Insurance, in Tax Reform, Implications for Economic Security and Employee
Benefits, Employee Benefits Research Institute (Dallas Salisbury, ed 1997).
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significant requirements on pensions except perhaps to the extent the
pensions provide some market benefit above and beyond private
savings. Requirements more costly than such benefits would simply
drive savings outs of pension plans.
The Flat Tax removes many but not all requirements for
pensions. Qualified plans would no longer need to satisfy the
nondiscrimination requirements, benefit limits, and the restrictions
on the timing of distribution. The employee protection requirements
of ERISA are retained, however, including standards as to eligibility,
vesting, funding and fiduciary rules. The empirical question is the
effect of retaining these rules in a world where most of the benefits
of a qualified plan can be achieved outside the plan and the general
conclusion is that the reduction in pension coverage would be
nontrivial.79
While the economic and policy issues associated with the
change in pension rules are significant, there are few surprising
implementation issues. To the extent the Flat Tax imposes
requirements in qualified plans, the rules will have to be
implemented and one imagines that they would look like those of
current law. Given the reduction in requirements from current law, it
is clear that the Flat Tax will be simpler than current law.
C. Death and the Estate Tax
Current law allows taxpayers to step up basis at death.80 The
Flat Tax has no particular rules about death but it does not need to.
The yield on investments is exempt, so a rule exempting gain on
death would have no effect.
Hall and Rabushka would eliminate the estate tax. This raises
many economic and fairness issues. From an implementation point
of view, however, elimination of the estate tax would be an
enormous benefit. The estate tax, of course, could be eliminated
under the current income tax structure.

79 Eric Engen and William Gale, Comprehensive Tax Reform and the Private

Pension System, in Tax Reform, Implications for Economic Security and
Employee Benefits, Employee Benefits Research Institute (Dallas Salisbury, ed.,
1997).
80 See section 1014.

69

Ironing Out the Flat Tax

D. Tax-Exempt Entities
Hall and Rabushka retain tax exemption for a category of
entities that roughly corresponds to charities under current law.
Other tax exempt entities under current law, such as labor unions
and trade associations, would be subject to the business tax.
Employees of tax-exempt entities under the Flat Tax would be
subject to the wage tax like any other employee. The entity would
pay a special tax on fringe benefits to mimic the nondeductibility of
fringe benefits for taxable entities. Contributions to tax-exempt
entities would not be deductible, unlike current law.
The benefit of tax exemption under the Flat Tax will often be
lower than under current law. The marginal return to capital is not
taxed under the Flat Tax so the business tax only taxes inframarginal
returns and transition capital. Exemption under the Flat Tax,
therefore, means exemption from these taxes. Some tax-exempt
entities, such as hospitals and educational institutions, may have
substantial operating assets and exemption from the transition tax
would be valuable for these entities. Other entities (as well as
educational institutions and hospitals) may have large endowments.
These endowments, however, are generally invested in taxable
businesses and the transition tax will be paid on these investments at
the business level.
Because the benefit of exemption is less under the Flat Tax,
many of the details of the existing tax-exempt regime will be less
important. Nevertheless, entities will care about exemption and
many of the current rules will be needed.
For example, the need to classify entities as exempt or not
means detailed rules for classification will be needed. Hall and
Rabushka define exempt entities as “educational, religious,
charitable, philanthropic, cultural, and community service
organizations that do not return income to individual and corporate
owners.” Each of these terms will need a definition and the notion of
returning income to owners will need substantial clarification.
Although the concept of an owner of a nonprofit is not clear, I
assume Hall and Rabushka mean to impose some sort of private
inurement rules like those of current law.
The taxation of non-exempt but nonprofit entities is not clear.
The most likely treatment would be for a labor union or a trade
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association be treated as selling services to its members in return for
dues. Dues would then be taxable receipts offset by the cost of
services provided. Any net receipts retained by the union or
association would be taxable. If in any year dues exceed expenses, the
union or association could face tax liability.
Suppose an entity that was tax-exempt ceases to be either
because it in part does not meet one of the required purposes or
there is private inurement. Its purchases would have occurred in
earlier years so no deduction would, without a special rule, be
available for the purchases, but any receipts would be fully taxable.
Effectively, there would be a one-time tax on all its capital. This is a
severe penalty to pay. Some sort of lesser sanction would be
necessary. One possibility is to treat the cessation of tax exemption
as the formation of a business, which would mean the business could
deduct the fair market value of its assets. This, however, would
require valuation. Another alternative is some sort of intermediate
sanctions regime under which entities could be penalized without
losing their exemption.
Suppose the entity basically retains its tax exempt purpose but
runs a candy store on the side. Under current law, the profits of the
candy store are subject to the unrelated business income tax
(UBIT).81 Would UBIT be necessary under the Flat Tax? There
would seem to be no reason to exempt assets of unrelated businesses
held by tax exempt entities from the transition tax or the tax on
inframarginal return. Therefore, as Hall and Rabushka acknowledge,
he UBIT rules would be needed, including the rules classifying
activities as related or not.
The private foundation rules would probably not be necessary
under the Flat Tax. There would be no tax advantage to forming a
tax-exempt entity to control funds because direct control by an
individual would be tax-exempt and there would be no deduction on
contribution. Even on transition there would be little or no benefit
because a private foundation is likely to have its assets invested in
taxable businesses which would be subject to the transition tax. If,
however, a deduction is allowed for charitable contributions, the
private foundation rules might be needed.
81 See sections 511 through 515.
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E. Financial Intermediaries
The treatment of financial intermediaries in consumption taxes,
including the Flat Tax, has been subject to analysis.82 The general
problem is that services such as free checking or intermediation are
not priced separately from the lending of money—the price of these
services are built into the interest rate. Interest, however, is exempt
under the Flat Tax, making it difficult to capture the consumption
element of these services. Observers have noted that the rules for
financial intermediaries are among the most complex rules in a
typical VAT.83
The Flat Tax does not created problems for financial services
different than those created generally by a VAT. In fact, the Flat
Tax may have some advantages over a VAT in this regard. The
reason is that VATs commonly exempt the services provided by
financial intermediaries. In the Flat Tax, such exemption does not
cover the value added by employees of the intermediary as they are
explicitly taxed on wages. Thus, failure to capture the value of
financial services provided by intermediaries is of less consequence in
the Flat Tax.
Hall and Rabushka provide a regime that attempts to capture
the value of financial services. They would require banks and
insurance companies to report the price of the services they provide
to depositors, measured as the difference between the market interest
rate and the lower rate that the bank pays on accounts that have
bundled services. Similarly, the service element in mortgage interest
charges, in the form of higher interest charged than the market rate
would be added to the tax based of a bank. This regime will be very
complex to implement.
David Bradford points out that bundled financial services are
not taxed under current law.84 It is not clear, therefore, that it is
82 See, e.g., David Bradford, Treatment of Financial Services under Income and

Consumption Taxes, in Economic Effects of Fundamental Tax Reform (Aaron
and Gale eds., 1996).
83 See Peter Merrill and Harold Adrion, Treatment of Financial Services under
Consumption-Based Tax System, 68 Tax Notes 1496, 1497 (1995).
84 David Bradford, Treatment of Financial Services under Income and
Consumption Taxes, in Economic Effects of Fundamental Tax Reform (Aaron
and Gale eds., 1996).
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worth the complexity to impose the valuation regime proposed by
Hall and Rabushka. In addition, there is at least some argument that
financial services are not generally consumption goods and,
therefore, should not be subject to tax.85
In any event, the most that can be said here is that the VAT
rules applicable to financial services are among the most complex in
the entire VAT system. There is no reason to believe that the Flat
Tax rules would be substantially simpler.
F. Odd Income and Deduction Items (such as tort benefits, prizes, etc.)
The basic income tax class at most law schools is filled with a
host of odd fact patterns designed to elicit answers to the question of
what is income. While many cases involve timing issues and,
therefore, will have reduced significant in the Flat Tax, many will be
present in the Flat Tax.
For example, the treatment of prizes or awards in the Flat Tax
must be determined. Hall and Rabushka propose to tax prizes given
by an employer to an employee but not other prizes. Prizes and
awards are generally considered income under current law and
certainly represent opportunities for consumption that can be taxed
under a consumption tax. Whether they should be taxable under the
Flat Tax, however, will depend on the treatment of the donor of the
prize. It is not clear under the Hall and Rabushka plan whether
prizes are deductible by the donor if the donor is a business.
Similarly, Hall and Rabushka propose to tax individuals on
workman’s compensation or other compensation for damages. This
language is ambiguous because it is not clear if it includes damages
unrelated to work. For example, amounts received for pain and
suffering in a slip and fall tort suit might not be covered under this
language. Under current law, some such damages are excludable and
commentators have differed on the desirability of such an exclusion.
The Flat Tax will have to determine the treatment of such items.
The tax benefit rule is likely to be needed under the Flat Tax.
That is, if a business claims a deduction, subsequently liquidates, and
the facts turn out to be inconsistent with the claimed deduction, the

85 See Harry Grubert and James Mackie, Must Financial Services be Taxed Under

a Consumption Tax? (on file with the author).
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deduction will have to be recaptured.86 And if the accrual method of
accounting is used, the claim of right doctrine will be needed.87
Unfortunately, much of the lore from current law, whether right
or wrong, cannot be adopted in the Flat Tax. The reason is that the
Flat Tax shifts the collection point of most taxes to the business level
from the individual level. Thus, whether an item should be in the tax
base may have similar answers under the Flat Tax and under the
income tax, but the proper treatment of the item to individuals and
to businesses may be very different.
G. Low-income Taxpayers and the Earned Income Credit
Hall and Rabushka do not include the earned income credit
(EIC) in their outline of the Flat Tax. Elimination of the EIC
means elimination of a significant poverty assistance problems. One
in five American families now collects the EIC.88 In addition,
without the EIC, the Flat Tax is likely to be significantly less
progressive than current law but the Flat Tax with the EIC may be a
reasonable facsimile to current progressivity.89 Pressure to maintain
some version of the EIC may be strong.
The current EIC is generally based on wages but is phased out
in part based on overall income. The Flat Tax, however, does not
require taxpayers to retain records or determine income other than
wage income. Implementation of the EIC, therefore, faces two
choices.
First, the EIC could be based solely on wage income. This
would significantly simplify the EIC. Adding only one or two lines
to the postcard return would allow such an EIC to be included in the
Flat Tax. The problem with this approach is that Congress has never
thought it appropriate to base the EIC solely on wages because those
living off of investments with low wages could claim the credit
86 See Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370 (1983) for a

Supreme Court holding on these facts.
87 The claim of right doctrine governs both when a disputed item of income must

be included and the treatment if a previously included, disputed item, is never
received.
88 See 141 Cong. Rec. S8404 (1995).
89 See William Gale, Scott Houser, and John Scholz, Distributional Effects of
Fundamental Tax Reform, in Economic Effects of Fundamental Tax Reform 290
(Henry Aaron and William Gale eds., 1996).
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notwithstanding ample resources. Since its inception the EIC has
included provision to prevent those with ample resources from claim
the credit and the rules have recently been strengthened.90 It is not
clear that Congress would be any more willing to base the EIC solely
on wages under the Flat Tax that it is under current law.
The second option for the EIC under the Flat Tax is to require
some level of income computations for all those claiming the EIC.
This computation could be relatively simple, such as a net worth test
or a realized income test. The problem is that doing so would
effectively put those who claim the EIC at least in part back in an
income tax system. Their net payments to the government would
depend in part on income. To the extent there are benefits to a
consumption tax for low wage individuals, this second option would
reduce these benefits. In addition, this option would increase record
keeping requirements considerably for many individuals.
Moving the EIC out of the tax system to the welfare system
does not change the analysis at all. A different agency and different
bureaucrats would administer the system but the implementation
and economic issues would remain the same. Combining the EIC
with existing welfare programs might reduce costs, but this decision
can be made notwithstanding the adoption of the Flat Tax.
H. State and Local Governments
The most significant issue facing state and local governments
would be the elimination of their ability to base their tax systems on
the federal income tax. Currently many states “piggyback” their
systems off the federal system, greatly simplifying administrative and
compliance costs.
Unless states switched to a base similar to the Flat Tax, few of
the implementation benefits of the Flat Tax would be achieved.
Taxpayers would have to compute their income for state tax purposes
and their Flat Tax liability for federal purposes. In fact, subjecting
taxpayers to both systems would likely increase implementation costs
from current law. Therefore reduction in implementation costs
requires a change in state tax laws.
90 The original EIC had a phase out based on modified adjusted gross income.

See H.R. conf. Re. No. 94-120 (1975). In 1995, Congress added the disqualified
income test. See section 32(i).
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All interest is exempt under the Flat Tax. Therefore, the rules
for tax-exempt bonds under current law could be eliminated. This
would be a great simplification but it would have the effect of
eliminating the preference for state and local bonds. Retention of the
preference would likely require rules similar to those of current law.
I. Filing Unit
Problems with the filing unit under the Flat Tax should be
similar to those under current law. Current law compromises
between three goals: progressivity, taxing married couples with the
same total income the same, and having individual’s tax situation
unchanged by marriage. These three principles are mathematically
incompatible. Under the joint filing system of current law, the third
principle is compromised so that tax liability may go up (in the case
of equal earners) or go down (in the case of unequal earners) upon
marriage.
The Flat Tax should have the identical problem with the only
difference being that it is generally less progressive than current law.
Thus, the Flat Tax will have marriage penalties or bonuses or tax
equal earning couples unequally.
The treatment of children is less problematic under the Flat Tax
than under current law. Current law includes the so-called “kiddie
tax” which taxes children at their parents’ rates. The most important
reason for the kiddie tax is to prevent parents from nominally giving
capital income to their children to take advantage of lower tax rates.
In the Flat Tax, capital income is not generally taxed, so the kiddie
tax will not be needed.
J. Transition
Hall and Rabushka propose no transition relief on the change to
the Flat Tax. Businesses would be subject to the cash flow tax
without regard to existing tax basis. Having no transition relief,
while raising political and economic issues, greatly simplifies
implementation
Even with no transition relief, however, there will be
opportunities for taxpayers to avoid the transition tax. In particular,
sales immediately prior to the transition tax to non-taxpayers would
allow recovery of existing basis. The sold property could then be
leased back or repurchased. Thus, one would expect substantial
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activity prior to an announced transition date to avoid the tax.
Virtually all of this activity would be inefficient and would lower
revenues.
From an implementation perspective, the question is whether
any rules should be put in place to prevent or reduce this activity. It
is not clear that any such rules would be successful. One option is an
explicitly retroactive transition date, that reached back to eliminate
basis for some unanticipated prior period. This would be reasonably
simple but unpopular. The alternative is to try to police sale-leasebacks and sales followed by repurchases. Any such rules would be
extremely complex although if sufficient revenue is at stake, may be
worthwhile.
Transition without relief would also have the potential to cause
significant dislocation for long term contracts. The most import set
of such contracts are debt instruments with fixed interest rates. Debt
instruments can have extremely long terms and if interest rates are
set under a system of deductible/includible interest, they may be
uneconomic under the Flat Tax rules. The exact effect will depend
on how prices and interest rates adjust on transition.91
If there is a significant chance of dislocations, some rules might
be needed to alleviate any that occur. For example, if interest rates
do not adjust downward but home mortgage interest becomes
nondeductible, many individuals may have trouble making
payments. Housing prices presumably would drop and these
individuals would be better off defaulting than continuing to try to
make mortgage payments. Even if this scenario has a small
probability of happening, if it cannot be ruled out on enactment of
the Flat Tax, some rules to accommodate homeowners might be
needed. It is not clear exactly what rules would be appropriate—a
better understanding of the likely transition effects is needed, but the
need for some such rules should be added to the implementation
costs.

91 See David Bradford, Fundamental Issues in Consumption Taxation (AEI Press

1996).
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Finally, there is a strong likelihood of transition relief (aside
from rules reducing dislocations from the lack of relief).92 A Fortune
article aptly stated, “Were Washington to disallow deductions [for
preenactment basis], every CEO-laden corporate jet in America
would commence strafing Capitol Hill.”93 Transition relief would be
complex. Ron Pearlman explores the various issues in creating such
relief. It is not worth repeating Pearlman’s analysis here. It is
sufficient to note that the implementation costs will be high.
IV. Conclusion:
Evaluation and Comparison to Current Law
Most students of the tax law generally had the intuition that
once the details of the Flat Tax were spelled out, the claims of
extreme simplicity would be discredited. The analysis here confirms
this intuition. The Flat Tax cannot be as simple as claimed and still
both raise revenue and not create adverse incentives. Many of the
implementation issues in the Flat Tax will be extremely complex,
and one can expect rules close to the level of detail and complexity of
those in current law. The Flat Tax will not come close to living up to
Hall and Rabushka’s prediction of postcard returns.
There are at least three reasons for the complexity of the Flat
Tax. First, the economy is complex. A simple concept such as taxing
fringe benefits at the business level, which Hall and Rabushka
propose for the Flat Tax, is extremely difficult to implement because,
in a complex economy, there are a wide variety of ways that
businesses can mix compensation and business expenditures.
Similarly, disallowing interest deductions but not deductions for
other expenditures, as proposed in the Flat Tax, sounds simple but
turns out to be complex because interest can be hidden.
Implementation of the current income tax in a complex economy is
complex, and implementation of virtually any other tax will be as
well.
92 See Ronald Pearlman, Transition Issues in Moving to a Consumption Tax: A

Tax Lawyer’s Perspective, in Economic Effects of Fundamental Tax Reform
(Aaron and Gale eds., 1996).
93 Louis Richman, The Flat Tax; It’s Hot; It’s Now; It Could Change the Way
You Live, Fortune (June 12, 1995), pp. 36, 44.

Chicago Working Paper in Law and Economics

78

Second, the Flat Tax has several unique features that introduce
both complexity and novelty. The most important of these features
are that the Flat Tax is open domestically and origin-based, unlike
any other significant consumption tax in the world. A tax that is
open and origin based with have inconsistencies and line drawing
problems that are difficult to eliminate. For example, transfer pricing
rules and complex rules for the taxation of financial instruments will
be needed because the Flat Tax is open and origin-based. Similarly,
the openness and origin-basis of the Flat Tax force the treatment of
losses to be modified from the usual treatment in consumption taxes,
which in turn means a host of business tax rules will be necessary.
The unique features of the Flat Tax mean that many compliance and
complexity problems will be completely new.
Finally, the taxation of small businesses is particularly vexing in
the Flat Tax. Under the Flat Tax, the treatment of a small business
is quite distinct from the treatment of the owner of the business or
from nonbusiness investments made by the owner. This distinction
is much sharper than under current law and creates problems. If
small businesses are taxed, they will be subject to onerous valuation
requirements. Moreover, they will be subject to all of the complexity
of the system for larger businesses (such as the transfer pricing,
financial products, and business tax rules discussed above). Difficult
issues under current law, such as the definition of independent
contractors and the use of small businesses to claim deductions for
personal expenses, will remain. If small businesses are exempt,
however, they will need to be subject to restrictive rules governing
the switching from exempt small business to taxable business. In
particular, valuation problems will particularly vexing on this
transition.
These three sets of problems involved only those issues given
close examination here. The brief examination of other issues, such
as the treatment of financial institutions, the earned income credit,
and tax-exempt entities, indicates that further complexities will arise
when the Flat Tax is actually implemented. One should also
remember that the Flat Tax considered here was pure—political
compromises were not generally considered. Thus, tax benefits for
powerful constituencies were not included. Political compromises
such as tax benefits for powerful groups impose large compliance
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costs under the current income tax. There is no reason to believe that
these compromises would not be repeated in the Flat Tax and
impose similar costs.
The claim of complexity, however, should not be overstated.
There are some significant simplifications in the Flat Tax. In
particular, the international tax rules can be significantly simplified,
primarily because of the territorial base. Elimination of capital gains
taxation and the classification issues associated with the capital gains
tax is a great improvement. Capitalization issues and inventory
accounting disappear. These are significant simplifications. Even so,
the claims of simplicity by proponents of the Flat Tax are wildly
overstated. Overall, one should expect a system that is simpler than
current law but not extremely so.94
To the extent that these simplifications are valuable, it may be
possible to achieve them through tax reforms other than the Flat
Tax. For example, the Flat Tax will be substantially more complex
than a European-style VAT. A reformed income tax, even one that
retains the realization requirement, may also be as simple as the Flat
Tax. For example, much of the international simplification in the
Flat Tax comes from its territorial system, which could easily be
adopted in an income tax. Similarly, a single level business tax might
reduce many of the complexities and adverse incentives of the
94 Quantification of the compliance and administrative costs would be extremely

helpful to the analysis, It is difficult, however, even to determine the total
compliance costs of current law, although estimates put it at about $75 billion per
year and it is even more difficult to estimate compliance costs under the Flat Tax.
See Joel Slemrod, The Simplest Tax System, in Economic Effects of Fundamental
Tax Reform, (Aaron and Gale, eds., 1996). It seems clear that they would be
lower, but the magnitude is uncertain.
Slemrod estimated that the total compliance costs of the Flat Tax to be about
$35 billion per year. Slemrod very likely underestimated the costs because many if
not most of the complexities discussed above were not known at the time Slemrod
did his estimates. For example, the mischaracterization of interest, the problems
with the loss carryforward rules, and the various business tax rules for formations
and liquidations of business, create the need for a host of rules and expensive tax
advice. One would expect that most of these rules would be on the same order of
magnitude as current law. Moreover, the complexities and inaccuracies identified
above create adverse incentives. Businesses will structure transactions to take
advantage of slightly incorrect tax rules rather than as they would absent taxes.
This type of restructuring is inefficient and loses revenue.
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current corporate tax. The financial products rules under an income
tax probably have greater potential to be coherent than under the
Flat Tax because an income tax will not have to have the same
distinction between interest and other flows. Accounting methods,
however, will be more vexing under a realization-based income tax
than the Flat Tax, although they are closer under an income tax to
book accounting, which is an advantage. Thus, many but not all of
the simplifications of the Flat Tax can be achieved in a reformed
income tax.
Without the claim of simplicity, the case for the Flat Tax
becomes extremely weak. A reformed income tax, or a combination
of an income tax and a VAT, can probably achieve virtually all of the
efficiency benefits of the Flat Tax while retaining the progressivity of
current law. At a minimum, given this complexity, advocates for the
Flat Tax should be required to demonstrate that its claimed
advantages in terms of economic efficiency and equity are real and
cannot be achieved through another method.
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